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ADMISSIONS AGAINST PINTEREST:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF
REVIEWING COLLEGE APPLICANTS'
SOCIAL MEDIA SPEECH
FrankD. LoMonte* & Courtney Shannon**

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Archie" is a straight-A, high school graduate with superlative
standardized test scores and extracurricular activities-well in excess of
the average credentials at his first-choice college, Riverdale State
University. "Betty," who works in Riverdale State's admissions office, is
about to put Archie's application into the "yes" pile when she decides to
perform one final check: running Archie's name through an internet
search engine. The top result is Archie's personal Facebook page, which
is publicly viewable.
Visiting the Facebook profile, Betty discovers that Archie has
"liked" the Facebook page belonging to rap artist Jughed Jonzz, who is
notorious for violent and misogynistic lyrics that glamorize drug
trafficking.1 Betty is alarmed. She notes that, in a recent post to his

* Professor & Director of the Joseph L. Brechner Center for Freedom of Information at the
University of Florida in Gainesville, Fla. B.A., 1992, Political Science, Georgia State University;
J.D. (Order of the Coif), 2000, University of Georgia School of Law.
** Legal Researcher, Joseph L. Brechner Center for Freedom of Information, J.D., 2022
(anticipated), University of Florida Levin College of Law.
1. As explained by the Fourth Circuit:
'Liking' on Facebook is a way for Facebook users to share information with each other.
The 'like' button, which is represented by a thumbs-up icon, and the word 'like' appear
next to different types of Facebook content. Liking something on Facebook is an easy
way to let someone know that you enjoy it.
Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted). In Bland, the Fourth
Circuit became the first federal appellate court to explicitly say that the act of clicking "like" to

show affinity for a Facebook page (such as a page belonging to a cause or a candidate) is an act of
expression that the First Amendment protects. See id. at 386 ("[L]iking a political candidate's
campaign page communicates the user's approval of the candidate and supports the campaign by
associating the user with it.").
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Facebook wall, Archie shared a news article about Jonzz's arrest for a
gang-related homicide, appending a comment: "Free Jughed! He was
framed!" Betty is concerned that, despite his stellar academic
credentials, Archie will be a poor fit for Riverdale State because his
affinity for Jonzz indicates poor character. His application goes in
Betty's "no" pile.
It seems undeniable in this fictional scenario that Archie has all of
the essential ingredients traditionally required for a First Amendment
case: Archie was eligible for a state benefit, which he would have
received if not for the content of his speech. Yet it is far from cleareither legally or practically-that Archie will have a First Amendment
claim. The question is: Why? Why do state colleges widely behave as if
they are free to disregard generally applicable First Amendment
principles in making admissions decisions when no other speech-based
government decisions are immune from constitutional scrutiny?
As a legal matter, courts have shown extraordinary deference to the
decisions of higher educational institutions, particularly where the
2
decision can be regarded as academic as opposed to punitive. For
instance, in a 2017 case, the Fourth Circuit found no constitutional
redress for an applicant who was docked points during a community
3
college admissions interview for bringing up his religious beliefs.
As a practical matter, legal challenges to admissions decisions are
rare and unlikely, with the notable exception of race-discrimination
claims. A rejected college applicant seldom receives an explanation that
connects the decision to constitutionally protected activity; admissions
offices do not typically notify unsuccessful candidates that a particular
Twitter post was the disqualifying factor. Accordingly, even a flagrant
constitutional violation is likely to go undetected and uncontested.
This Article suggests that there is no doctrinal grounding for the
notion that public higher education admissions is a "First
Amendment-free zone." In no other area of government can a benefiteven a wholly discretionary one-be withheld or rescinded on the basis
5
of constitutionally protected speech. The question should not be
A
2. See Fernand N. Dutile, Disciplinary Versus Academic Sanctions in Higher Education:

Doomed Dichotomy?, 29 J. COLL. & U.L. 619, 619 (2003) (explaining that "[a]cademic sanctions
have occasioned greater deference from the courts" and that judges "have accorded universities
decision is
great leeway in determining both the need for and the extent of any sanction" once the
categorized as an academic one).
3. Buxton v. Kurtinitis, 862 F.3d 423, 430-33 (4th Cir. 2017).
4. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213-15
(2013) (holding that discretionary federal grant could not be denied to a nonprofit organization
because its principals refused to sign a blanket waiver of First Amendment rights).
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whether a state institution has total discretion to withhold admission
because of an applicant's speech-that answer indisputably should be
"no"-but at what point the withholding decision becomes an actionable
violation of the applicant's constitutional rights.6
The impetus for this Article was the annual survey of college
admissions officers by Kaplan Test Prep, which since 2015 has indicated
that somewhere between twenty-five and forty percent of admissions
employees say that they look at applicants' social media profiles to learn
more about them.7 Given that at least some of the surveyed admissions
officers will necessarily come from public institutions where the First
Amendment applies,' the survey results raise profound questions about
whether speech extrinsic to the application process can be the basis for
withholding college admission. It is not at all clear that universities are
observing First Amendment boundaries in assessing what applicants
write and share. For instance, admissions officers told Kaplan that one
red flag indicator that can diminish an applicant's odds of acceptance is
"vulgarities in blogs," which under any ordinary understanding of the
Constitution is beyond the government's authority to regulate. 9
Social media profiles can be a revealing window into the lives of
their creators, and perhaps, in the case of admissions decisions, too
revealing. An admissions officer viewing a Facebook or Instagram
account may learn all manner of information about a candidate that

6.
7.
Social

See infra PartV.
See Kaplan Survey: Percentage of College Admissions Officers Who Visit Applicants'
Media
Pages
on
the
Rise
Again,
KAPLAN
(Jan.
13,
2020),

https://www.kaptest.com/blog/press/2020/01/13/kaplan-survey-percentage-of-college-admissionsofficers-who-visit-applicants-social-media-pages-on-the-rise-again [hereinafter Kaplan] (reporting
that 36% of 300 college admissions officers surveyed looked at social media profiles as part of the
admissions decision, up from the previous year's 25%).
8. See AM. ASS'N OF COLLEGIATE REGISTRARS & ADMISSIONS OFFICERS, SOCIAL MEDIA
MONITORING AND THE ADMISSIONS PROCESS 3-4, 14 (2017), https://www.aacrao.org/docs/default-

source/research-docs/social-media-monitoring-and-the-admissions-process--july-60-secondsurvey.pdf?Status=Temp&sfvrsn=4dd22026_4 [hereinafter AACRAO SURVEY]; widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1981) ("[O]ur cases leave no doubt that the Fist Amendment rights
of speech and association extend to the campuses of state universities.").

9. See Kashmir Hill, What College Admission Officers Don't Like Seeing on Facebook:
Vulgarity, Drinking Photos & 'Illegal Activities,' FORBES (Oct. 12, 2012, 11:11 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/10/12/what-college-admission-officers-dont-likeseeing-on-facebook-profiles-vulgarity-drinking-photos-and-illegalactivities/?sh=68b87c402170#156353812170 (reporting on results of the 2012 Kaplan survey of
admissions officers, which found that thirty-five percent of those who checked applicants' social
media pages found "something that negatively impacted an applicant's chances of getting into the
school"); Azhar Majeed, Defying the Constitution: The Rise, Persistence, and Prevalence of

Campus Speech Codes, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 481, 495 (2009) ("A publicly told offensive joke
or the use of vulgar or indecent language ... would not come close to meeting any of the carved-out
exceptions to the First Amendment.").
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10
cannot legitimately be considered as part of the admissions decision.
For instance, the admissions officer might see photos indicating that the
applicant is engaged to someone of the same sex or of a different raceinformation that a public university could not require the applicant to
disclose-which might trigger the admissions officer's personal biases."
As one commentator has noted, incorporating social media into the
admissions process "could be used as a way around antidiscrimination
laws entirely."" For this reason, it matters whether universities have
standards confining what (if anything) admissions officers may view and
consider from the realm of social media.
The question of constitutional rights and college admissions gained
new salience in 2020, as the nation roiled with racial tension provoked
by excessive police force directed disproportionately against Black
people.1 3 As the public focused greater attention on the online discourse
about issues of race and equity, incoming first-year college students
found themselves publicly called to account for offensive social media
4
posts written during their high school years.' In response to high-profile
controversies, many colleges (including some public ones) responded by

10. See Edward N. Stoner II & J. Michael Showalter, Judicial Deference to Educational
Judgment: Justice O'Connor's Opinion in Grutter Reapplies Longstanding Principles, as Shown by

Rulings Involving College Students in the Eighteen Months Before Grutter, 30 J. COLL. & U.L. 583,
614-15 (2004).
The Internet has lifted the veil of individual privacy, so that information about factors
like race, class, gender, sexual orientation, obesity, physical handicaps, unpopular
opinions, and nonmainstream clothing styles become easily visible to employers,
potential employers, college admissions personnel, law enforcement officials, welfare
providers, loan companies, landlords, merchants, and many other societal decision
makers.
Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Digital Scarlet Letters: Social Media Stigmatization of the
Poor and What Can Be Done, 93 NEB. L. REV. 592, 596 (2015).
11. See, e.g., Koenig & Rustad, supra note 10, at 614; Felicia O. Kaloydis et al., Sharing
Political and Religious Information on Facebook: Coworker Reactions, 6 J. Soc. MEDIA SOC'Y,

no. 2, 2017, at 239, 260-63.
12. Katherine Pankow, Friend Request Denied: Chapter 619 Prohibits Colleges from
Requesting Access to Social Media Accounts, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 620, 625 (2013) (describing
enactment of a California statute that forbids colleges from demanding social media login
credentials from current or prospective students); see infra Part III.B (discussing similar statutes
protecting applicants from social media intrusion).
13. See Andrea Januta et al., Challenging Police Violence ... While Black, REUTERS (Dec.
23, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunityrace; Tatiana Navarro, Students, Others Forwarding Racist Online Postsfor Public Shaming, Real-

World Consequences, WUFT (June 17, 2020), https://www.wuft.org/news/2020/06/17/students-

others-forwarding-racist-online-posts-for-public-shaming-real-world-consequences.

14. See Navarro, supra note 13 (describing a string of firings and other consequences imposed
after social media users publicly called out students for racially offensive online behavior).
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rescinding offers of admission.15 In many of these instances, the speech
at issue would be well within the broad boundaries of what the First
Amendment protects in contexts outside of higher education. 16
Once a student has enrolled in a state institution, it is
well-established that constitutional protections attach and that
enrollment may not be taken away without due process or for
viewpoint-discriminatory reasons. 7 So the decision to reject an
applicant, or to withdraw acceptance, raises questions about the breadth
of the Due Process Clause, as well as the First Amendment, if the
decision is based on speech.
This Article attempts to clarify unsettled questions about when a
public educational institution may consider an applicant's speech in
making an initial admissions decision, and what recourse should be
available to students whose lost opportunity to attend their chosen
college is based on speech extrinsic to the admissions process. 18 In Part
II, the Article sets out the known limits of government agencies'
authority-both within the university setting and beyond-to award or
withhold benefits based on the content of a speaker's speech.1 9 Part III
focuses specifically on the evolving and uncertain law governing student
speech on social media, what the courts have said about a university's
authority to police students' online expression, and how recent
controversies over offensive posts have brought to the fore questions
over the legal limits of campus punitive authority. 20 Part IV describes the
findings of the annual Kaplan Test Prep survey of admissions officers,
15. Greta Anderson, Universities Revoke Admissions Offers, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 8,
2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/2020/06/08/universities-revoke-admissi
on-offers-over-hateful-speech; see also Morgan Gstalter, LSU Says Admitted Student Who Posted
Racist Rant on Social Media Won't be Enrolled, HILL (June 16, 2020, 3:16 PM),
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/502999-1su-says-admitted-student-who-filmedhis-racist-rant-wont-be (reporting on recent controversies at Louisiana State University and the
University of Florida involving racially offensive online speech by students admitted but not yet
enrolled).

16. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 15 (noting that the Foundation for Individual Rights in
Education, a free speech watchdog, claimed that "'controversial speech,' especially at public

universities, [is] . . . subject to the First Amendment"); Navarro, supra note 13 ("Efforts to invoke
consequences even for racist posts can collide with First Amendment protections, especially at state
universities, which are also governed by state constitutional protections.").
17. See Mark P. Strasser, Student Dismissals from Professional Programs and the

Constitution, 68 CASE W. RSRV. L. REv. 97, 114-18 (2017) (analyzing case law holding that due
process protections adhere to expulsion decisions at public institutions); see also Papish v. Bd. of
Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 669-71 (1973) (per curiam) (ordering the reinstatement of a college student
who was expelled for using harsh language in anti-police articles and illustrations in
student-produced newspaper).
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
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and how they use social media in the admissions process, and then turns
to the results of a Joseph L. Brechner Center for Freedom of Information
("Brechner Center") survey of public universities, finding that
essentially none of them provide any training or guardrails to limit the
discretion of admissions officers in considering applicants' online
speech.2 Part V analyzes the constitutional implications, under the First
Amendment and Due Process Clause, of denying an applicant admission
22
to college based on the content of online speech. Finally, Part VI
recommends a way forward for public higher-educational institutions,
suggesting: (1) that if social media is to be part of the admissions
screening process at all, stringent guidelines must constrain the ability to
make subjective, viewpoint-based decisions; and (2) that rejected
applicants should have at least minimal process assuring them of an
opportunity to explain what may be a harmless contextual or cultural
misunderstanding, so that a life-altering decision does not turn on a
miscommunication.2 3
II.
A.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT, ON AND OFF CAMPUS

Content-BasedRegulations and the "Rights-Privileges"Distinction

The First Amendment protects free speech against government
infringement, but although the text of the amendment speaks in absolute
terms, courts have never interpreted the right to be limitless.24 In general,
First Amendment free speech protections prohibit the government from
either restraining speech from being heard, or imposing punitive
consequences after the fact, if the motivation is the content or viewpoint
of the speaker's message.25 The courts have recognized narrow
categories of unprotected speech where the value of the speech is
regarded as especially minimal in light of the countervailing societal
interest in avoiding harm. 26 For example, speech that is obscene, a "true

21. See infra PartIV.
22. See infra PartV.
23. See infra Part VI.
24. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570-72 (1942).
25. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regulations are
presumptively invalid."); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) ("[W]hen the
government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech
on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly limits its
power.").
26. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382-83.
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threat," or an intentional incitement to imminent violence can be
proscribed and penalized, even criminally. 27
The government cannot censor speech based purely on
disagreement with its sentiment. As the Supreme Court has emphatically
stated, the "government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 28 Viewpoint
discrimination is an especially disfavored subspecies of content-based
discrimination. 29 A law found to prefer or disadvantage particular
viewpoints is an "egregious form of content discrimination," which is
"presumptively unconstitutional." 30 Content-based or viewpoint-based
restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny review, which
requires the government to justify incursions on fundamental rights by
showing that the restriction is necessary to achieve a compelling
government interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, a
nearly insurmountable burden. 31
In Watts v. United States,32 the Supreme Court reasoned that
regulations that penalize "pure" speech (as opposed to conduct
incidental to speech) "must be interpreted with the commands of the
First Amendment clearly in mind," recognizing the freedom of the
public to comment and debate on political issues in an "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open" way that can include speech that is "vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp."" The Watts case illustrates
how high the Court has set the bar for speech to qualify as categorically
unprotected, and how the context of the speech is often the decisive
consideration. Thus, the Court refused to find that speech constituted a
criminally punishable threat even where the speaker referred wishfully
to shooting President Lyndon Johnson, because the remark was phrased
conditionally and was delivered in the larger context of an anti-war
political speech, so the audience recognized the comment as figurative. 34
The Supreme Court did not recognize the First Amendment as a
constraint on state and local government until 1925, in the landmark case

27. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (holding that fighting words are within the realm of
unprotected speech when the words "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace").
28. Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
29. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
30. Id. at 829-30.
31. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Frank D.
LoMonte, Fouling the FirstAmendment: Why Colleges Can't, and Shouldn't, Control Student
Athletes' Speech on Social Media, 9 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 1, 4-6 (2014).
32. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
33. Id. at 707-08 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
34. Id. at 705-08.
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of Gitlow v. New York.35 In that case, the Court, for the first time,
recognized freedom of speech as among the fundamental freedoms that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects from
36
Today, it is firmly
infringement by all levels of government.
local governmentand
state,
federal,
of
established that all agencies
including public institutions of higher education-are subject to First
Amendment constraints,37 although (as we shall see) the level of latitude
38
afforded to regulators varies with the setting and context.
When the government imposes consequences on a speaker with the
objective of inhibiting constitutionally protected speech, the First
Amendment is implicated. 3 9 But for decades, federal courts took a
narrow view of what could constitute an actionable deprivation
sufficient to sustain a First Amendment case. Early First Amendment
case law made a decisive distinction between the loss of a right or
40
entitlement, versus the loss of a merely discretionary "privilege." Only
the former, it was believed, could give rise to a First Amendment
claim. 41 But during the latter half of the twentieth century, courts came
to recognize that any loss of a valuable benefit-even a wholly
discretionary benefit-could be enough to chill a speaker from
42
exercising legally protected rights.
The erosion of the rights-privileges distinction began with Justice
William O. Douglas's majority opinion for the Supreme Court in a 1946
case, Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.4 There, the Court held that the
Postmaster General could not use his congressionally delegated
discretion over the mailing rates for periodicals to deny preferential
second-class postage privileges to Esquire magazine merely because he

35. 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
36. See id. ("For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States.").
37. See id.; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1981).
38. See infra Part I.B.
39. See Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-SensitiveApproach to
the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 991, 1031-32 (2012) (explaining that "governments
'chill' protected speech by restricting some other form of speech that, while unprotected, is similar
to the speech getting chilled").
40. See Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law: The Priceof ProtestingToo Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69, 71-72 (1982).
41.

See Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights that Work at Work: From the FirstAmendment

to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1465-66 (2007) (explaining origins of the
"rights-privileges distinction" in constitutional law).
42. See id. at 1466-67.
43. 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
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found the magazine's content to be "morally improper and not for the
public welfare and the public good."44 Justice Douglas wrote:
[G]rave constitutional questions are immediately raised once it is said
that the use of the mails is a privilege which may be extended or
withheld on any grounds whatsoever.. . . Under that view the
second-class rate could be granted on condition that certain economic
or political ideas not be disseminated.4 5

In 1958, the Court cited Hannegan and ruled that California could not
condition receipt of a property tax break for veterans on executing an
oath pledging loyalty to state and U.S. governments. 46 "[T]he denial of a
tax exemption for engaging in certain speech," the Court wrote,
"necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain
from the proscribed speech." 7
The Court had historically treated public employment as a privilege
that could be withheld or revoked at will. But that began changing with
Justice Tom C. Clark's 1952 opinion in Wieman v. Updegraff,48 which
found that the State of Oklahoma could not force state employees to
forswear involvement in any "communist front or subversive
organization" as a condition of employment. 49 Because the oath statute
contained no requirement of scienter-a state employee could be fired
for having innocently joined a harmless group that took a turn into
subversive activity-the Court found that the statute violated employees'
due process rights. 50 The Wieman Court rejected the notion that there
can be no constitutional violation in withdrawing a benefit, like a
government job, that the holder has no vested right in retaining, holding:
"We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public
employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection
does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is
patently arbitrary or discriminatory.""
In a case analogous to college admissions screening, the Court
decided in 1971 that a state bar association could not constitutionally
reject an applicant for refusing to answer an eligibility questionnaire
asking about past involvement with the Communist Party. 52 The Court

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 149, 158-59.
Id. at 156.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518, 528-29 (1958).
Id. at 519.
344 U.S. 183 (1952).
Id. at 184-86, 192.
Id. at 189-91.
Id. at 191-92.
Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 4-5, 8 (1971).
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observed that the First Amendment prohibits state actors from inquiring
into people's beliefs in a way that discourages them from exercising
3
constitutionally protected rights. "[W]hatever justification may be
offered," Justice Hugo Black wrote for the Court, "a State may not
inquire about a man's views or associations solely for the purpose of
54
withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes."
55
In a 1972 decision, Perryv. Sindermann, the Court made its most
explicit declaration that, for purposes of a constitutional claim,
"privilege" is no longer a concept of significance:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even
though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and
even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number
of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may
not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in
56
freedom of speech.

The Court swept away any remaining remnants of the
rights-privileges doctrine in the 2013 case of Agency for International
Development v. Alliance for Open Society International,Inc., 5 holding
that even a discretionary government grant to which the grantee has no
claim of entitlement cannot be conditioned on a broad waiver of First
Amendment rights beyond what is necessary for the effective operation
of the grant program.5 8 For college applicants, the implications of this
doctrinal evolution are profound. Being rejected from the college of
59
A loss of such
one's choice can carry life-altering consequences.
magnitude unquestionably would be enough to motivate people of
reasonable firmness to modify their behavior, including refraining from
speech. 60 Being denied admission to college, then, is a deprivation that
can support a First Amendment claim, even if acceptance is regarded as
a wholly discretionary privilege that a state institution would otherwise
be free to withhold. 61

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Id. at 597.
570 U.S. 205 (2013).
Id. at 218-21.
See infra PartVI.B.
See Coenen, supra note 39, at 1031-32.
See Clay Calvert, Rescinding Admission Offers in Higher Education: The Clash Between

Free Speech and Institutional Academic Freedom When Prospective Students' Racist Posts Are

Exposed, 68 UCLA L. REv. DISCOURSE 282, 291-92 (2020).
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The Constitutionand the Campus

When the speaker is a student and the regulator is a school, courts
apply considerable deference to regulatory and punitive decisions. 62
While First Amendment freedoms still exist, they have been relaxed in
light of what the Supreme Court has called "the special characteristics of
the school environment." 6 3 The Court has occasionally spoken to the
rights of students in the postsecondary setting, but its signature
pronouncement on the state of student rights took place in the context of
K-12 education in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District." In Tinker, when students were punished for silently protesting
the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to school, the Supreme
Court held that schoolchildren have free speech rights that are not
automatically shed when they cross the threshold of the campus. 65 In
analyzing the Des Moines school district's decision to punish the
protesters, the Court coined an enduring half-measure First Amendment
standard that enables schools to restrict speech if there is a concrete
factual basis to anticipate "substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities." 66 This is a meaningful level of
constitutional protection, but it is nowhere near the level recognized by
the courts in the off-campus world.
Beginning in the 1980s, a more conservative Supreme Court began
rolling back the Tinker standard by carving out contextual exceptions. 67
The Court gave schools license to punish sexually explicit speech in
front of a student audience, without the burden of demonstrating a
material or substantial disruption, in Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser.68 In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,69 the Court held
that the Tinker level of protection ceases to apply when a student seeks
to use a school-provided curricular platform to disseminate a message. 70
When speech bears the "imprimatur" of the school, unlike the Tinker
students' armbands, the school has a free hand to censor, so long as its
justification is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 71
62. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969).
63. Id. at 506.
64. 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969); see Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of
University Students, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1801, 1828 (2017).
65. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504-06.
66. Id. at 514.
67. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhhmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988).
68. 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986).
69. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
70. Id. at 271-73, 276.
71. Id. at 271-73.
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For the first time, the Court dealt with the extension of school
72
punitive authority beyond school premises in Morse v. Frederick.
There, the Court decided that an Alaska school did not offend the First
Amendment by suspending a student who stood across the street from
the school during the nationally televised ceremonial running of the
Olympic torch, holding up a homemade sign that read "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS." 73 The Court once again created a doctrinal exception to Tinker,
finding that speech promoting the use of dangerous illegal drugs is
categorically unprotected from school discipline, even if no disruption
occurs. 7 4 The Court chose not to deal with the arguably out-of-school
context of the speech by likening the Olympic relay event to a
school-supervised field trip, where school authority continues to apply
75
even beyond school walls. Quoting the school principal's brief, the
Court's majority wrote that a student "cannot stand in the midst of his
fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and
76
By treating the speech as occurring at
claim he is not at school."
the more difficult issue-at that
confronting
school, the Court avoided
early age of social media and smartphones, still a nascent issue-of a
school's ability to regulate truly off-campus speech.
Whether the standards that apply to public K-12 institutions also
apply to public colleges and universities remains unsettled. The
Hazelwood Court explicitly reserved judgment on whether adult-age
college students would have a greater degree of censorship protection in
light of the very different context of a college campus." Nevertheless,
lacking explicit guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts have, at
times, reached into the K-12 toolkit to resolve disputes in the college
setting. 78 The Supreme Court has recognized universities as "peculiarly

72. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
73. Id. at 397, 409-10.
74. Id. at 403-04, 408.
75. Id. at 400-01.
76. Id. at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274 n.7 (1988).
78. See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that, although
Hazelwood was coined in the K-12 context, the standard "works for students who have graduated
from high school"); Keeton v. Anderson-wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating that
"Hazelwood informs our analysis" of a college's decision to penalize a graduate student for speech
made in the context of a school-supervised practicum); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir.
2005) (en banc) (holding that Hazelwood provides the analytical framework for claims of
censorship by college students prevented from distributing a college-subsidized newspaper); see
also Papandrea, supra note 64, at 1828 (noting that the Supreme Court has left important questions
about college free speech rights unresolved and that "some lower courts have used the [C]ourts'
decisions relating to K-12 public education to provide this missing guidance").
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the marketplace for ideas," 79 and has never held that speech receives
diminished protection against government sanction just because the
speaker is a student and the government agency is a university. 80 Time
and again, the Court has protected students against action by public
university administrators that would chill constitutionally protected
expression, most notably in the case of a University of Missouri student
who was disciplined for an underground newspaper containing articles
and illustrations presaging the modern Black Lives Matter movement. 81
In that 1973 case, the Justices held that a state university could not
constitutionally discipline a student even for grossly offensive speech
one political cartoon vividly depicted police officers raping the Statue of
Liberty and Lady Justice-because "the First Amendment leaves no
room for the operation of a dual standard in the academic community
with respect to the content of speech."8 2
While the Supreme Court has long indicated that First Amendment
standards apply with full force in the university setting, which suggests
that Tinker is an insufficiently protective standard, the Court has also
drawn on Tinker in the higher-education setting for the proposition that
free speech rights must be applied in light of "the special characteristics
of the school environment." 83 Thus, the Court has given sanction to a
relatively deferential review of speech-restrictive decisions by campus
policymakers, which other courts have embraced more explicitly. 84

79. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972) ("The college classroom with its
surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,' and we break no new constitutional

ground in reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom." (quoting
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967))); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 267 n.5 (1981) (quoting Healy, 408 U.S. at 180-81).
80. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 180.
81. See Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 667-68, 671 (1973) (per curiam); see also
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 834-37 (1995); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264-66, 269,
276-77. The Black Lives Matter movement is a modern movement aimed at protesting
contemporary, systemic issues regarding Black Americans. See generally Char Adams, A
Movement, a Slogan, a Rallying Cry: How Black Lives Matter Changed America's View on Race,

NBC News (Dec. 29, 2020, 10:04 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/movement-sloganrallying-cry-how-black-lives-matter-changed-america-n1252434 (describing the history and impact
of the Black Lives Matter movement).
82. Papish,410 U.S. at 667, 671.
83. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268 n.5 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506); see also Christian Legal
Soc'y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 685-86 (2010) (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268 n.5).
84.

William E. Thro, No Angels in Academe: Ending the ConstitutionalDeference to Public

Higher Education, BELMONT L. REV., 2018, at 27, 31 ("In the view of the judiciary, higher
education administrators are 'angels'-entitled to greater deference than constitutional actors in

other spheres."); see also Stoner & Showalter, supra note 10, at 584 ("Administrators in higher
education enjoy unique judicial deference, recognized by the Supreme Court, when they are
applying their educational judgment in situations involving college students . .. . [C]ourts

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 6

786

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:773

Relevant to the question of what speech on a social media account
can be the basis for an adverse admissions decision, courts have
overwhelmingly struck down campus disciplinary codes that penalize
offensive speech. 85 The First Amendment forbids enforcing "overbroad"
government policies that sweep in benign speech in an attempt to
86
penalize threats and harassment. The Due Process Clause forbids
enforcing vague government policies that fail to give fair notice of what
conduct is punishable.87 Plaintiffs have successfully challenged campus
88
speech codes on both bases. In DeJohn v. Temple University, the Third
Circuit invalidated a policy proscribing "hostile," "offensive," and
"gender-motivated" speech on overbreadth grounds, observing that
"overbroad harassment policies can suppress or even chill core protected
speech, and are susceptible to selective application amounting to
89
Similarly, the Sixth
content-based or viewpoint discrimination."
Circuit found that a policy proscribing speech that is "offensive" or
"demeaning" on the basis of race or ethnicity, even if "unintentional,"
was unconstitutionally overbroad.90
Adding to the complexity of speech in the higher-education setting,
universities may have affirmative legal duties, enforceable by way of
sanctions under the Title IX gender-discrimination statute, to protect
91
students against speech that rises to the level of harassment. In one
closely watched case, a federal appeals court held that the University of
Mary Washington in Virginia could be legally responsible for failing to
respond to complaints about a pervasive level of harassing speech
transmitted via the (now-defunct) social chat app Yik Yak, where
historically have been loathe to interfere with most decisions involving the application of
educational judgment at the university level.").
85. See Majeed, supra note 9, at 484, 494 (stating that federal case law "is remarkable for its
uniform rejection of speech codes and consistent upholding and protection of students' speech
rights"). For examples of cases declaring campus speech prohibitions unconstitutional, see Coll.
Republicans v. Reed, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F.
Supp. 2d 853, 872 (N.D. Tex. 2004); Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 372-73
(M.D. Pa. 2003).
86. DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 314 (3rd Cir. 2008). "A statute is unconstitutional
on its face on overbreadth grounds if there is 'a realistic danger that the statute itself will
significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the
[C]ourt."' Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Members of
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984)).
87. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law.").
88. 537 F.3d 301 (3rd Cir. 2008).
89. Id. at 314.
90. Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1182-83.
91. See Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 685-86, 693 (4th Cir. 2018).
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campus-specific discussion boards often devolved into juvenile insults. 92
Understandably, college administrators may feel whipsawed by
seemingly conflicting legal obligations. 93 For this reason, it is important
for the Supreme Court to conclusively say whether-and if so, by how
much-First Amendment rights diminish in the higher-educational
setting, particularly when the speech is online.
C.

Whose "Academic Freedom"Is It, Anyway?

Academic freedom is a "special concern of the First
Amendment."9 4 Universities are bastions of free thought and expression,
and courts have recognized that exposure to "widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints" is an essential part of creating an
intellectually productive campus environment.95
Judicial recognition of academic freedom as a principle with legal
force had its headwaters in the Supreme Court's 1957 ruling in Sweezy v.
New Hampshire.96 The Sweezy case arose when a University of New
Hampshire professor was jailed for contempt after he refused to fully
answer questions when called before a state attorney general's inquest
seeking to root out communists in state government.9 7 The professor
challenged a state statute that compelled him to be interrogated about his
political beliefs, and the Supreme Court agreed that being forced to
disclose past political associations violated his constitutional rights,
holding: "We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of
petitioner's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political
expression-areas in which government should be extremely reticent to
tread." 98 Thus, from its inception, academic freedom was interpreted to
protect not just academic institutions, but the people who teach there.

92. Id. at 682-83, 693.
93. In an especially revealing case, Yeasin v. Univ. of Kan., two sister universities arrived at
opposite interpretations of their authority over what students say on social media during their
off-hours. 360 P.3d 423, 430 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015). The University of Kansas, defending against a
student's First Amendment case, told the Kansas courts that Title IX compelled universities to
exercise authority over interpersonal disputes on social media, while Kansas State University filed
an amicus brief disagreeing that Title IX requires universities to police off campus, online
expression. Id. at 429-30.
94. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
95. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329-30 (2003).
96. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
97. Id. at 238-40, 242-45.
98. Id. at 236, 248, 250.
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The boundaries and contours of academic freedom as a legal
99
doctrine have never been firmly established. The doctrine has come to
mean that certain decisions are so uniquely the province of scholars that
courts and external policymakers should tread lightly in second-guessing
them. 100 Thus, universities enjoy a measure of judicial solicitude for
managerial decisions that implicate the use of academic expertise. As the
Supreme Court said in rejecting the claims of a former medical student
who asserted a due process right to retake a crucial qualifying exam:
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely
academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for
the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it
unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms
as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not
101
actually exercise professional judgment.

In the view of at least some courts, academic freedom also means
that professors at public universities have heightened free speech
02
While
protections beyond what other government employees enjoy.
for
protection
Amendment
First
no
receive
employees
ordinary public
the
under
assignments
job
speech that is made pursuant to official
03
some
standard set by the Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos,
courts have cited academic freedom in affording college educators a
measure of legally protected freedom to choose what and how they
teach, and to speak and publish on controversial matters that put them at
odds with their employers.104 Not all courts, however, subscribe to this
view. The Fourth Circuit, for instance, rejected faculty members'
academic-freedom-based argument that their scholarly work should be
off limits to public inspection under the Virginia Freedom of
Information Act, holding: "Our review of the law ... leads us to
conclude that to the extent the Constitution recognizes any right of
'academic freedom' above and beyond the First Amendment rights to

99.

See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99

YALE L.J. 251, 253 (1989) ("Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine [of academic
freedom] floats in the law, picking up decisions as a hull does barnacles.").
100. See id. at 296-98.
101. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
102. See id. at 225-27; Byrne, supra note 99, at 273, 313-14, 336-38.
103. 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
104. See Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 411-12 (9th Cir. 2014) ("We conclude that Garcetti
does not-indeed, consistent with the First Amendment, cannot-apply to teaching and academic
writing that is performed 'pursuant to the official duties' of a teacher and professor."); see also

Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259, 268-71 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that an applicant for a law
school faculty position could proceed on a First Amendment failure-to-hire claim against a state
university that, she alleged, penalized her for her conservative political beliefs).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss3/6

16

LoMonte and Shannon: Admissions against Pinterest: The First Amendment Implications of

ADMISSIONS A GAINST PINTEREST

2021 ]

789

which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in
individual professors." 105
A university's academic freedom is understood to include deciding
who is a suitable candidate for admission.106 The interplay of academic
freedom and admissions is rooted in the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke, 10? involving
a challenge to the use of race as a consideration in medical school
admissions at public universities in California.10 8 Although no rationale
garnered a five-vote majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.'s influential
and oft-cited plurality opinion observed: "Academic freedom, though
not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed
as a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the
selection of its student body." 109
Courts and commentators have recognized the inherent paradox that
academic freedom can protect both the managerial autonomy of the
institution and also the interests of instructors that come into conflict
with their employers."1 0 This apparent conflict is reconciled if academic
freedom is understood not as protection for parties but for processes.
The seminal Sweezy decision, which is credited with codifying academic
freedom, says nothing about protecting university administrative
decisions, but quite a bit about protecting free inquiry: "Scholarship
cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will
stagnate and die."" Sometimes, university administrators will be
105. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 409-12 (4th Cir. 2000).
106. The connection between university academic freedom and admissions appears to be
rooted in Justice Frankfurter's influential concurrence in Sweezy, in which he referenced "'the four

essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,

what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New

Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Byrne, supra note 99, at
311-12 (calling it anomalous that a university's autonomy in admissions has been regarded as a
concern of the First Amendment, which "rarely protects institutional decision-making so indirectly
related to expression as student admissions or faculty hiring").

107. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
108. Id. at 269-70, 312.
109. Id. at 312-13.
110.

"Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of

ideas among teachers and students .. . but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous
decision-making by the academy itself." Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226
n.12 (1985) (citations omitted); see also J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to ConstitutionalAcademic

Freedom, 31 J. COLL. & U.L. 79, 89 (2004) (observing that "courts and scholars began to see
conflict between individual and institutional conceptions of constitutional academic freedom").

111.

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
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exercising academic freedom, but at other times, they will be trampling
1 2
On those latter occasions, it makes no sense to
academic freedom.
apply judicial deference in the name of protecting a "freedom" that the
defendant institution itself is accused of violating. Academic freedom
deference properly belongs to the institution when the conflict is
between the university and a government regulator (e.g., a legislative
enactment that requires purging ideologically disfavored professors), but
not when the university is itself the regulator imposing a
1 3
freedom-restricting policy." Understood in this way, academic freedom
can, at times, belong to the student in a dispute that implicates
fundamental freedoms.
1 4
The Supreme Court said as much in Healy v. James, a case
pitting the First Amendment rights of students against a censorious
institution that refused to extend official recognition to a chapter of
11 5
Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS"). The President of Central
Connecticut State College invoked the University's academic freedom as
a justification for rejecting the group, claiming that SDS stood for
1
violence and disruption that would interfere with the rights of others.' I
But the Court turned the tables on the President, finding that academic
freedom pointed in the student speakers' favor: "The college classroom
with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas, and
we break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation's
7
dedication to safeguarding academic freedom."" Concurring, Justice
Douglas went even further:
The present case is minuscule in the events of the 60's and 70's. But
the fact that it has to come here for ultimate resolution indicates the
sickness of our academic world, measured by First Amendment
standards. Students as well as faculty are entitled to credentials in their
8
search for truth."

The Fifth Circuit applied the Healy academic freedom passage in
recognizing the right of students at the University of Mississippi to
distribute a literary magazine over the objection of college

112. See Byrne, supra note 110, at 88-89.
113. Professor Byrne, who has deeply analyzed the judicial evolution of academic freedom,
makes the point in a slightly different way: "[G]overnment legitimately can regulate those aspects
of a university's work that promote democratic values." Byrne, supra note 99, at 333.
114. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
115. See id. at 172-74.
116. Id. at 174-76 (stating that the president decided "approval should not be granted to any
group that 'openly repudiates' the College's dedication to academic freedom").
117. Id. at 180-81 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
118. Id. at 197 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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administrators, who disapproved of stories with themes of Black pride
and interracial romance. 11 9 The University chancellor offered a variety
of justifications for seeking to restrain the publication, including his
belief that distributing a magazine containing strong profanity "would
endanger the current public confidence and good will which the
University of Mississippi now enjoys." 120 The court found none of the
proffered rationales sufficient to override the students' First Amendment
interests, citing "the historical role of the University in expressing
opinions which may well not make favor with the majority of society
and in serving in the vanguard in the fight for freedom of expression and

opinion."121

As these cases demonstrate, universities do not have the authority
to burn down academic freedom in order to save it. 12 2 Where the
interests of academic freedom and of the university administration align,
and the university is acting to preserve academic freedom, judicial
deference makes sense. But "academic freedom" is not properly
understood as a synonym for "university decision-making freedom."
Courts have been unhesitant to say so in the context of discipline of
professors,12 1 and should be equally unhesitant in any case where the
effect of the university's use of authority is to diminish the exchange of
ideas-even where the plaintiff is a student applicant.
III.

A.

DRAWING THE LINE, ONLINE

Social Media Tests Courts'FirstAmendment Convictions

The advent of social media has tested courts' adherence to
long-established First Amendment principles.124 Some have been willing
to fashion workarounds, enabling universities to regulate social media
119. Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 572, 580-81 (5th Cir.), aff'd as modified, 489 F.2d 225
(5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam).
120. Id. at 575-76, 579.
121. Id. at 580-81; see also Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 722, 723-24 (4th Cir. 1973) (citing
Healy's concern for safeguarding academic freedom and finding that a public university could not
constitutionally expel two students responsible for a letter-to-the-editor of the campus newspaper
that referred to the University President using a profanity).
122. While the saying has become blurred by time and repetition, the phrase "destroy the town
to save it" was popularized by famed Vietnam War correspondent, Peter Arnett, who attributed the
remark to an unnamed U.S. Army major. Stephen L. Carter, Destroying a Quote's History in Order

to Save It, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 9, 2018, 2:50 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2018-02-09/destroying-a-quote-s-history-in-orderto-save-it (discussing the evolution of the
phrase).
123. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
124. See LoMonte, supra note 31, at 10-12.
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speech that would otherwise be constitutionally protected outside the
campus setting. 12 1 In an illustrative recent case, a New Mexico graduate
student lost his First Amendment challenge to disciplinary action based
on a profane Facebook rant in which he bemoaned President Obama's
reelection as a victory for abortion advocates, whom he called "sick,
disgusting people" comparable to Nazis during World War II.126
Although the student did not reference the University or anyone
attending it, the post was reported to the Dean of Students at the
University of New Mexico College of Medicine ("UNM"), who
punished the student, Paul Hunt, for violating university policies that
127
Hunt challenged the
require social media speech to be "respectful."
disciplinary action as a violation of his First Amendment rights, but the
United States District Court dismissed his claims against UNM
administrators on the grounds of qualified immunity, finding no clearly
settled law that prohibits a public university from punishing a student for
128
The
off-campus political speech that is uncivil and inflammatory.
Tenth Circuit affirmed, citing the muddle of cases at both the K-12 and
college level in which educational institutions have extended their
disciplinary reach into students' off-hours speech with mixed
outcomes. 129
The Hunt court was influenced by a handful of rulings in which
lower courts have been willing to entertain that students enrolled in
pre-professional programs have diminished free speech rights-less
protection, even, than K-12 students-because of their universities'
gatekeeping role in keeping unsuitable people out of highly regulated
professions.1 30 For instance, in one influential ruling early in the history
of "social media discipline" cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court found
that a public university could punish a mortuary science student for
alarming her Facebook followers with jokes of questionable taste about
the cadaver she was assigned to dissect, so long as the discipline was
consistent with "established professional conduct standards" for her

intended field.'
125. See id. at 12-13.
126. See Hunt v. Bd. of Regents, 792 F. App'x 595, 598, 606 (10th Cir. 2019) (affirming
dismissal of the student's First Amendment claims on qualified immunity grounds).
127. Id. at 597-99.
128. Id. at 599-600.
129. Id. at 605-06. The Supreme Court declined certiorari and allowed the dismissal of Hunt's
claims to stand. Hunt v. Bd. of Regents, No. 19-1225, 2020 WL 6829148, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 23,
2020).
130. See, e.g., Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Minn. 2012).
131. Id. at 512-13, 521; see also Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 526-27, 531 (8th Cir. 2014)
(holding that the college did not violate the student's First Amendment rights by removing him for
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Colleges have been especially assertive about policing online
speech by a visible subcategory of students: competitive intercollegiate
athletes. 12 It has become common practice for athletic departments to
limit, and in some instances ban, athletes from using certain social media
platforms, or to require that athletes who use privacy settings on their
social media accounts allow the athletic department staff to view posts
that are not visible to the general public.1 33 Entire businesses are built
around monitoring-for-hire services, reviewing posts shared by athletes
and reporting back to the athletic department if certain "red-flagged"
words or images appear, such as references to drugs or the names of
sports agents.134 At least some coaches extend this controlling approach
to the initial admissions process as well.' One college football coach
told The Los Angeles Times that he had broken off recruiting high school
athletes after seeing that they had used coarse language in the "handle"
of their Twitter accounts.1 36

insulting a classmate during a series of dueling Facebook posts because the discipline was based on
professional standards for the nursing industry); Yeasin v. Durham, 224 F. Supp. 3d 1194,
1199-1200, 1203-04 (D. Kan. 2016) (granting qualified immunity to university defendants for the
decision to expel a student on the basis of Twitter posts regarded as violating a "No Contact Letter"
against a fellow student because "circuit courts have come to conflicting conclusions on whether a

school can regulate off-campus, online student speech where such speech could foreseeably cause a
material disruption to the administration of the school").
132. See LoMonte, supra note 31, at 23-25.
133. See Michelle Poore, A Call for Uncle Sam to Get Big Brother out of Our Knickers:
ProtectingPrivacy and Freedom of Speech Interests in Social Media Accounts, 40 N. KY. L. REV.

507, 513-14 (2013).
134. Jamie P. Hopkins et al., Being Social: Why the NCAA Has Forced Universities to Monitor
Student-Athletes' Social Media, PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y, Spring 2013, at 1, 38-40; see also John
Browning, Universities Monitoring Social Media Accounts of Student-Athletes: A Recipe for

Disaster, 75 TEX. BAR J. 840, 842 (2012) (observing that colleges have instructed social media
monitoring companies to alert them not just when athletes mention bribery, cheating, or other
wrongdoing, but also words like "Arab," "Muslim," and "gay").
135. See, e.g., Matt wilhalme, Tweet at Your Own Risk: Coach Rejects Recruits Based on

Twitter
Handle,
L.A.
TIMES
(July
16,
2015,
11:32
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-college-recruits-rejected-based-on-twitter-handl
e-20150716-story.html (noting that one coach "can't possibly be the first coach to vet his players

through social media, but his comment about digging into a person's online profiles to look for red
flags is a clear warning for potential college recruits").

136. Id. A Twitter account held by an assistant football coach at Arkansas Tech University
posted this cautionary tweet in 2019: "Recruits: social media matters. I have now dropped 15
recruits this year because of their twitter posts, likes, or retweets. Explicit images, racist words, and
demeaning posts are unacceptable. Your thumbs are killing your opportunities." Coach Lawson
(@jwlawsonl),
TWITTER (July 20, 2019, 7:55 AM),
https://twitter.com/jwlawsonl/
status/1 152547572738924544.
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UnfriendingBig Brother: The Legislative Response

In response to concerns that employers were unduly intruding into
current or prospective employees' lives by demanding access to social
media login information as a condition of employment, states across the
country began enacting privacy laws restricting what employers can
37
According to the
demand to see and under what circumstances.1
National Conference of State Legislatures ("NCSL"), twenty-six states
now have statutes protecting the right of employees to refuse demands

for nonpublic account information that would enable supervisors to read
their private communications.13 8 Impelled by the same privacy concerns,
legislative sponsors added protection for current or prospective college
students to many of the bills; the NCSL reports that, as of 2020, sixteen
states had statutes forbidding postsecondary educational institutions
from insisting that students or applicants divulge social media login
credentials.1 39 Outside of sports, there is no documentation of a
widespread practice of requiring rank-and-file students or applicants to
share their login credentials, although one attorney whose practice
focuses on social media privacy told NBC News that he has received
complaints from applicants who were told during face-to-face interviews
to show the interviewers the non-public content posted to their social
40
media accounts.
In a typical example of how these privacy laws work, New Jersey's
2012 statute provides that no higher education institution, whether public
or private, may ask whether a student or applicant has accounts on social
media platforms, demand access to a non-publicly viewable account, or
retaliate against a student or applicant for refusing to provide access."'
137. See Brittany Dancel, Comment, The PasswordRequirement: State Legislation and Social
Media Access, 9 FIU L. REV. 119, 123-25 (2013) (explaining that Maryland was the first state, in
2012, to enact an employee social media privacy law, prompted by the case of an applicant for a job
with the state prison system who was told to turn over his social media login information as a
precondition of employment).
138.

See State Social Media Privacy Laws, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (July 27,

2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-lawsprohibiting-access-to-social-media-usemames-and-passwords.aspx.
139. See id.
140. Bob Sullivan, Govt. Agencies, Colleges DemandApplicants' FacebookPasswords, NBC
NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012, 6:13 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/technolog/govt-agencies-collegesdemand-applicants-facebook-passwords-328791. The same attorney, Bradley Shear, told the ABA
Journal of an "epidemic" of colleges insisting that students install "spying software" on personal
electronic devices so their movements could be tracked, a practice that social media privacy
legislation also outlaws. David L. Hudson, Jr., Site Unseen: Schools, Bosses Barredfrom Eyeing
AM),
8:10
1,
2012,
(Nov.
Workers' Social Media, A.B.A. J.
Students',
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/siteunseenschoolsbosses_barredfrom.._eyeing~stu
dents_workerssocialmedia.
141. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:3-30 (West 2020) (effective Dec. 3, 2012).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss3/6

22

LoMonte and Shannon: Admissions against Pinterest: The First Amendment Implications of

2021 ]

ADMISSIONS AGAINST PINTEREST

795

Some also go further, and outlaw requiring students to change their
account setting from "private" to "public" so that their posts can be more
easily monitored, or adding university officials as authorized viewers of
their non-public, secured accounts.1 4 2 Others also forbid a practice
known as "shoulder surfing," which requires that a student login to a
secured account in the presence of a university employee so that the
employee can peek at the non-public contents. 143 Privacy protection is
not absolute, however; the statutes typically provide a workaround if
college administrators need access to investigate certain types of
wrongdoing, such as unlawful use of university computers.144 The
growing adoption of these statutory protections represents a public
policy consensus that both current and prospective students enjoy some
zone of privacy beyond which their educational institutions may not
reach, even if the information accessible through social media profiles
might be of interest to college authorities and relevant to an admissions
decision.
IV.

SOCIAL MEDIA AND COLLEGE ADMISSIONS

A.

Surveying the Landscape

Since 2008, Kaplan Test Prep, a leading worldwide provider of
training services and materials for a wide range of standardized tests, has
been surveying college admissions officers about whether prospective
students' social media activity plays a part in decisions to accept or
reject.14 That initial 2008 survey found that just 10% of admissions
employees ever looked at applicants' social media accounts in the course
of making a decision, but the numbers quickly shot up in succeeding

142. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-60-104(b)(2) (Lexis through 2020 First Extraordinary
Sess. and 2020 Fiscal Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 8103(d) (2020),
https://delcode.delaware.gov/title14/titlel4.pdf.
143. Dancel, supra note 137, at 138-39 (citing CAL. EDuc. CODE § 99121 (West 2012)).
144. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 350.272(2)(a) (2019), https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bil
Is_laws/ors/ors350.html (providing an exception to social media privacy, if access is demanded "for
the purpose of ensuring compliance with applicable law, regulatory requirements or prohibitions
against student misconduct, that is based on the receipt of specific information about activity
associated with a personal social media account").
145.

Kaplan Test Prep Survey: Percentage of College Admissions Officers Who Check Out

Applicants' Social Media Profiles Hits New High; Triggers Include Special Talents, Competitive
Sabotage, BUSINESSWIRE (Jan. 13, 2016, 10:07 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20
160113005780/en/Kaplan-Test-Prep-Survey-Percentage-of-College-Admissions-Officers-Who-Che
ck-Out-Applicants%E2%80%99-Social-Media-Profiles-Hits-New-High-Triggers-Include-Special-T
alents-Competitive-Sabotage [hereinafter Kaplan Test Prep Survey].
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years.14 In 2015, a high of 40% of admissions officers acknowledged
that, at least some of the time, they reviewed social media as a factor in
evaluating an applicant. 147 In that year, the survey respondents told
Kaplan that they check social media for a variety of reasons, including to
verify claims of leadership positions or awards, or to check for evidence
48
of criminal activity or "inappropriate behavior."1 A solid majority of
admissions officers told Kaplan that it is "fair game" to review
applicants' social media accounts, even if they do not do so
themselves.1 4 9
Interviewees told Kaplan that they flagged a wide variety of content
as troublesome, including some that indicated constitutionally
unprotected activity (such as underage drinking or drug abuse), and
other content that might well have qualified as constitutionally protected,
such as "vulgarities."" 0 However, the survey did not go as far as to ask
exactly what types of online speech would be regarded as disqualifying,
or how often a candidate's social media activity was decisive to the fate
of the application.
In its most recent survey (2019-20), Kaplan reported that 36% of
the 288 admissions officers surveyed say they look at applicants' social
media profiles to learn more about them; of those who acknowledge
having looked, 19% say they do so "often.""' Of those who check, 38%
told Kaplan that the contents of social media worked in the applicants'
2
favors, while 32% said the contents had adverse effects.
There are 1,626 accredited public colleges and universities in
3
America and 1,687 private, nonprofit institutions." Assuming that the
practice of checking social media accounts occurs with comparable
frequency among public and private institutions alike, that would mean
(by Kaplan's most recent survey results) 585 public institutions at least

146. Hill, supra note 9.
147. Kaplan Test PrepSurvey, supra note 145.
148. Id.
149.

See Scott Jaschik, Social Media as 'FairGame' in Admissions, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr.
2

23, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/ 018/04/23/new-data-how-collegeadmissions-officers-view-social-media-applicants (citing 2018 Kaplan findings that "admissions
officials at more than two-thirds of colleges (68 percent) say it's 'fair game' for them to review
applicants' social media profiles on sites like Facebook, Instagram and Twitter to help them decide
who gets in").
150. See Hill, supra note 9.
151. Kaplan, supra note 7.
152. Id.
153. Number of Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions and Enrollment in These
Institutions, by Enrollment Size, Control, and Classification of Institution: Fall 2017, NAT'L CTR.
(last visited
FOR EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dl8/tables/dtl8_317.40.asp

Apr. 1, 2021) [hereinafter PostsecondaryInstitutions].
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sometimes review applicants' online profiles as part of the admissions
decision."1 4 Even if public institutions may be somewhat less likely to
rely on social media as a factor in the admissions decision, the Kaplan
findings suggest that hundreds of state colleges do consider applicants'
online speech in deciding who gets admitted.
Bolstering the Kaplan findings, the American Association of
Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers ("AACRAO") surveyed
member institutions in July 2017 and found that the use of social media
as part of the admissions process was widespread and increasingly
accepted as legitimate.155 Specifically, 11% of respondents said they had
refused to admit an applicant based on social media content.' 5 6 This
includes 8% of those employed by public institutions, where the First
Amendment applies, although private institutions were somewhat more
likely to report making an adverse admissions decision based on
personal social media activity. 5 7 The AACRAO survey found that 30%
of institutions acknowledged reviewing the personal social media
accounts of applicants at least some of the time.158
B.

Profiledfor Rejection: Are Social Media Pages "FairGame "for
Review?

Knowing that a substantial share of college admissions officers
considers applicants' online speech as part of the decision process, the
logical questions become: Is there any stopping point to their discretion?
Are admissions officers told that any category of speech-political,
religious, artistic-is off limits for consideration? Is it possible that
applicants are losing a chance at admission to a state college for no
reason other than political, religious, or artistic speech?
154. Compare id., with Kaplan, supra note 7 (showing findings from both surveys used to
determine the number of public institutions which sometimes review the online profiles of
applicants).
155. AACRAO SURVEY, supra note 8, at 1-3.
156. Id. at 2. Interestingly, this was somewhat greater than the seven percent who responded
that their institutions had rescinded an offer to an already-admitted student. See id. This reaffirms
the concern that, while considerable attention is being paid to the use of social media in revoking
admission after a public controversy, the role of social media in the initial admissions decision is
underappreciated and worthy of greater consideration. See Jaschik, supra note 149.
157. See AACRAO SURVEY, supra note 8, at 13-14.
158. Id. at 9. The AACRAO approach somewhat differs from the Kaplan approach, in that the
Association also looked at whether colleges review their own social media accounts as part of the
admissions process, to see whether applicants are interacting with the accounts (for instance, leaving
comments on an institutional Facebook page, or referencing the institution's Twitter handle).
Compare id. at 11, with Kaplan, supra note 7. This is not a concerning practice, as a person who
consciously interacts with the college's official accounts is knowingly attracting the college's
attention (and, indeed, may be purposefully seeking to do so).
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Researchers from the Brechner Center surveyed 119 public colleges
and universities during the spring and summer of 2020, asking for copies
of any policies, standards, or regulations governing whether, and to what
extent, applicants' social media accounts may be taken into
159
consideration in the admissions process. The colleges were chosen to
reflect geographic diversity; the pool included institutions in forty states.
Of the 119 that received standardized requests under the applicable state
freedom-of-information statute, 46 of them (38.6%) failed to respond
entirely, 16 and the remaining 73 (61.4%) all provided a variation of the
same response: no such policy or regulation exists. In no instance did
any university furnish any handbook, manual, or directive to guide the
exercise of discretion in considering applicants' online speech. Of the 73
institutions that responded, 13 of them (17.8% percent of those
responding) stated affirmatively in their responses that they did not
consider social media profiles as part of the application process, while
60 (82.2% percent of those responding) simply stated that no policy
exists. Only one institution, Kansas State University, volunteered any
level of detail as to how social media figures into the admissions
decision; a Kansas State spokesperson stated that admissions officers
"often" will run Google searches and/or seek out applicants' social
media pages if the applicant is known to have a prior criminal or
disciplinary history.'
The Brechner Center's findings align with, but are more
pronounced than, the findings of the AACRAO in its July 2017 survey.
The AACRAO found that just 12% of institutions that acknowledge
looking at applicants' social media pages have a formal policy governing
how social media figures into the admissions decision, meaning that

88% have no formal policy. 162 The AACRAO reported that 10% of
public institutions claimed to have a formal policy, as compared with

159. The surveyors obtained their information through responses to FOIA requests sent to each
of the institutions. All materials and responses remain on file with the authors.
160. The research project began during March 2020, just as workplaces across the country
were shuttering out of concern for spreading COVID-19, which likely accounts for the low rate of
compliance with legally compulsory requests. See Nate Jones, Public Records Requests Fall Victim
AM),
9:01
2020,
1,
(Oct.
POST
Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH.
the
to
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/public-records-requests-fall-victim-to-the7 5
00
c-b a -Ilea-a8da-693df3d7674astory.html (reporting
coronavirus-pandemic/2020/10/01/cba25
federal agencies and local government offices
many
by
records
that "the disclosure of public
nationwide has worsened or even ground to a halt" as employees were sent to work from home
during the pandemic).
161. E-mail from Hanna L. Manning, Univ. Open Recs. Custodian, Kansas State Univ., to
Frank D. LoMonte, Dir., Brechner Ctr. for Freedom of Info. (July 16, 2020) (on file with author).
162. AACRAO SURVEY, supra note 8, at 15.
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14% of private nonprofit institutions and 11% of private for-profit

colleges. 1 63
The lack of any intelligible standard by which state employees pass
judgment on applicants' speech raises significant constitutional
concerns. 1" The Supreme Court has cautioned that "[b]ecause First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may
regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." 165 If applicants to state
colleges are led to believe that anything they say can and will be used
against them, without limitation, the chilling effect on expression will be
far-reaching.16 6
V.

A.

DRAWING THE LINE: WHAT PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS CAN AND
CANNOT CONSIDER

When Admissions DecisionsAre Susceptible to Challenge

While there is no published legal authority addressing whether an
applicant rejected on the grounds of social media speech has a
constitutional claim against the institution, admissions decisions are
regularly challenged in a different (and potentially instructive) context:
when a rejected applicant claims to be a victim of racial
discrimination.16 7 In those situations, a justiciable claim exists, although
university policies are reviewed relatively deferentially. 168 Racial
discrimination in college admissions implicates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the decision maker is a state
institution.169 Indeed, the Supreme Court has determined that reliance on
race as a consideration in the admissions decision is subject to strict
scrutiny review, although it is possible for an institution to satisfy that

163. Id. at 16.
164. See infra Part V.D (discussing due process case law that disfavors open-ended speech
restrictions vesting government decision makers with "unbridled discretion").
165. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
166. See id. at 432-33 ("The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as
the actual application of sanctions.").
167. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251-52 (2003) (involving rejected applicants
who claimed racial discrimination violations against the University of Michigan).
168. See Vikram David Amar & Jason Mazzone, How Much Deference Will Be Given to
Affirmative Action Plans Fashionedby Students, and to Affirmative Action Plans More Generally?

Part Three in a Series on the Challenge to Harvard Law Review's Diversity Program, VERDICT
(Mar. 8, 2019),
https://verdict.justia.com/2019/03/08/how-much-deference-will-be-given-toaffirmative-action-plans-fashioned-by-students-and-to-affirmative-action-plans-more-generally.
169. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276 (finding that the University of Michigan's freshman
admissions policy was applied in a manner contravening applicants' right to equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
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demanding standard by reference to higher education's compelling
17 0
interest in diversity.
In a pair of companion 2003 cases against the University of
Michigan, the Supreme Court held that Michigan's law school had
demonstrated that its race-conscious admissions program was
constitutional, but that the consideration of race in Michigan's
17 1
undergraduate admissions was not. In the law school case, Grutter v.
Bollinger,1 72 the Justices recognized that college admissions decisions
traditionally receive deferential review, stating: "Our holding today is in
keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a
university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed
174
decision
limits." 173 But in the accompanying Gratz v. Bollinger
the
mention
not
involving undergraduate admissions, the Court did
concept of deference at all. The Court simply concluded that Michigan's
policy of awarding a "decisive" number of bonus points to "virtually
every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant" flunked
strict scrutiny, because it did not reflect individualized consideration of
the diversity benefits that any particular applicant might bring to the
first-year class.175 The takeaway from these cases is that "universities are
allowed to make determinations about who may be admitted to study,
including using race as one of many factors, but only if those
determinations are based upon careful and deliberate exercise of
76

educational judgment."'
In other words, the question in the context of race discrimination
claims is not whether the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
applies, but what weight a college may assign to race as part of the array
of considerations that inform the admissions decision. As these
discrimination cases establish, college admissions decisions are not
sacrosanct, and they do not take place in a "law-free zone" of
unreviewability.1 77 Having established that it is possible for a college
admission decision to violate an applicant's constitutional rights, there is

170. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291, 311-15 (1978) (finding that
the use of race or ethnicity in admissions decisions triggers strict scrutiny, but that student body
diversity is a "compelling" governmental interest that can justify including race or ethnicity as a
factor, so long as the racial classification is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest).
171. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-77.
172. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
173. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
174. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
175. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72.
176. Stoner & Showalter, supra note 10, at 612.
177. Id. at 612-15.
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no principled reason to deny applicants recourse under the First
Amendment.
B.

The Constitutional Consequences ofRevoking College Admission

Racially motivated hate speech presents uncertainties in the
higher-education setting. Off campus, the Supreme Court has declined to
withdraw protection from speech just because it is racially offensive (the
use of an ethnic slur as a federally approved trademark)' 7 8 or even
outright hateful (burning a cross to express white supremacist beliefs). 7 9
It is clear that "hate speech" does not exist as a categorically unprotected
class of speech for purposes of the civil or criminal justice systems. 8 0
But the Court has yet to take a case involving campus discipline for
speech that targets a vulnerable minority in ways that provoke severe
discomfort.
While there has been little discussion of the rights of students
denied admission on the grounds of social media speech, considerable
attention is focusing on the related issue of colleges rescinding
already-granted admission after offensive social media posts come to
light. 81 Racially insensitive speech on social media attracted heightened
public concern after the May 2020 police killing of an unarmed,
46-year-old Black man, George Floyd, ignited protests worldwide,
lending renewed urgency to racial justice initiatives.18 2 While much of
the attention focused on racist online speech by police,1 83 teens also
found their account histories scrutinized, and, in some cases, publicly
called out.18 4
In the private sector, revocation implicates no First Amendment
protections.1 85 Harvard University has been in the news on several
178. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
179. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347-49 (2003).
180. See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764.
181.

Dan Levin, Colleges Rescinding Admissions Offers as Racist Social Media Posts Emerge,

N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/02/us/racism-social-media-collegeadmissions.html.
182.

Zack Schermele, Racist Social Media Posts from Students Are Forcing Colleges to

Respond, TEEN VOGUE (July 6, 2020), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/racist-social-media-postscollege-students; Jennifer Hassan & Siobhan O'Grady, Anger over George Floyd's Killing Ripples
Far Beyond the United States,
WASH.
POST (May
29,
2020, 2:20 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/05/29/world-reacts-george-floyd-minneapolisprotests.

183. Katie Way, Cops Are Getting Fired over Their Racist Social Media Posts, VICE (June 11,
2020, 4:04 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/dyz7yz/cops-getting-fired-for-racist-social-mediaposts.
184. Schermele, supra note 182.
185.

Levin, supra note 181.
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occasions for withdrawing offers to students caught making racist,
186
In 2019, a
anti-Semitic, or misogynistic remarks on social media.
student who attained notoriety as a survivor of the mass school shooting
in Parkland, Florida had his Harvard admissions offer revoked after he
wrote a racial slur eleven times in a single post and shared crude
comments about women. 187 The University of Denver publicly rescinded
its admissions offer to a prospective student who posted racially
offensive photos on social media, framing the decision as part of a larger
effort to create a campus climate free of harassment and aggression
88
toward nonwhite students.'
But public institutions do not have the same level of discretion to
regulate expression, because their acts are regarded as "state action" to
amid
apply.189 Nevertheless,
guarantees
which constitutional
high-profile racial unrest that gripped the nation during 2020, several
public institutions rescinded admissions offers of prospective students
190
over posting racist and offensive social media memes and comments.
A student accepted to the University of Florida was publicly "outed" as
the creator of racist posts on Instagram; after an investigation, the
University announced that the student "will not be joining the University
of Florida community this fall," though it was left unclear whether the
19
student agreed to step aside or was ordered to do so. 1 Similar cases
involving racially insensitive speech on social media were reported at
the College of Charleston and the University of Connecticut, among
others.'

92

186.

See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, Was Harvard Correct to Revoke Admissions Offers over Offensive

187.

Neal Colgrass, Parkland Survivor Who Made Racist Remarks Gets Bad News, NEWSER

2
Posts?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 12, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/ 0
17/06/12/experts-consider-harvards-revocation-admissions-offers-those-offensive (reporting that ten
students were disinvited from attending Harvard for using racially offensive language in online
chats).

(June 17, 2019, 4:16 PM), https://www.newser.com/story/276648/parkland-survivor-who-maderacist-remarks-gets-bad-news.html.
188. Jeremy Haefner, We Stand Together: A Statement by Senior Leadershipat the University
of Denver, UNIV. OF DENVER (June 2, 2020), https://www.du.edu/news/we-stand-togetherstatement-senior-leadership-university-denver.
189. See Byrne, supra note 99, at 299.
190. See Levin, supra note 181.
191. Sarah Nelson, Cape CoralSenior Who Wrote Racist Social Media Post Won't Attend UF
https://www.newsAM),
10:16
2020,
10,
(June
Fall, NEWS-PRESS
the
in
press.com/story/news/2020/06/10/cape-coral-mariner-high-student-racist-social-media-post-wontattend-uf-fa1l5332972002.
(June 22, 2020,
192. Scott Jaschik, Colleges Reverse Admissions Offers, INSIDE HIGHER ED
2
https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/2020/06/2 /colleges-reverseAM),
3:00
admissions-offers.
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Professor Clay Calvert has suggested that, because universities'
academic freedom extends to the admission decision, students will have
difficulty prevailing on a First Amendment claim if their admission is
revoked on the grounds of later-discovered social media posts that
reflect poor character.l'9 Because admissions is regarded as a "holistic"
evaluation of suitability, Calvert argues, a college could successfully
argue that the review of social media speech is part of an academic
judgment to which courts owe deference. 194
Regardless of whether a student has a constitutional claim for a
decision to rescind acceptance, the initial admissions decision is
analytically distinct for an important reason: An admitted student who
becomes the target of public outcry over social media speech will know
why the offer was rescinded.' 95 An applicant who receives the
standard-form "we regret to inform you" email from the admissions
office will not. 196 Moreover, the existence of the outcry might itself
arguably provide a basis for the decision to rescind.1 97 If (as many courts
believe) postsecondary institutions have the same level of authority over
student speech that K-12 schools do, the Tinker standard permits
content-based punishment where speech "would substantially interfere
with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other
students."1 98 If enough fellow students insist that they would be fearful
attending college alongside a student with abhorrent racial views, that
reaction could arguably furnish the factual basis that the Tinker standard
demands.1 99 By contrast, when the admissions officer makes the decision
unilaterally-without notice, and based on nothing but a speculative fear
193. See Calvert, supra note 61, at 291-92 ("[I]nstitutional academic freedom affords
universities a large degree of autonomy, discretion, and deference when they decide who should be
admitted to study.").

194. Id. at 289.
195. See Jaschik, supra note 192 (presenting a number of examples where universities publicly
announced their reasons for rescinding admissions offers).
196. See, e.g., College Rejection Letter (12+ Sample Letters & Examples), WORD TEMPLATES
ONLINE, https://www.wordtemplatesonline.net/college-rejection-letter (last visited Apr. 1, 2021)

(providing examples of standard college rejection letters).
197. Compare Taylor Lorenz & Katherine Rosman, High School Students and Alumni Are
Using Social Media
to Expose Racism,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
16,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/style/blm-accounts-social-media-high-school.html
(demonstrating the massive amount of attention that racist social media speech has received), with
Jaschik, supra note 192 (offering various statements by universities that racist posts circulating
throughout social media do not align with university values of diversity and inclusion).
198. See Papandrea, supra note 64, at 1828 (describing some courts' use of the K-12 school
speech precedent in the context of higher education); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969).
199. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (stating that the administrators' speculative fear of a potential
disturbance could not override the plaintiffs' free speech interests because "undifferentiated fear or

apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression").
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of future adverse reaction-neither the constitutional minima of due
process, nor of the First Amendment, are satisfied. Such a decision, then,
can be valid only if there is zero level of constitutional protection in the
admissions process. Because of this distinction, even settling the
unsettled question of whether a student has a constitutional claim after
losing acceptance in response to public outrage over speech does not
also conclusively settle the question of whether a student has a claim for
wrongfully being denied admission based on online speech.
C.

The FirstAmendment and Admissions

When the federal courts began retreating from the now-discredited
"rights-privileges distinction" that formerly gave government decision
makers a free hand to withhold discretionary benefits on the basis of
constitutionally protected activity, among the principal beneficiaries
were college professors. 200 In 1964, the Supreme Court considered the
case of University of Washington faculty members challenging the
constitutionality of a state mandate requiring them to execute a pair of
oaths, under penalty of perjury, affirming that they would "promote
respect" for the United States and refrain from assisting "subversive"
activity. 201 The Court found the oaths facially unenforceable on
vagueness grounds, implicating both the First Amendment and the Due
Process Clause. 202 The Court noted that both the oath against promoting
subversive activity and the oath requiring "undivided allegiance" to the
U.S. government could penalize or deter a good deal of constitutionally
protected expression, such as refusing to salute the American flag on
religious grounds. 203 Then in 1972, the Court took up the case of four
Buffalo University professors who balked at signing an oath affirming
that they were not associated with the Communist Party and would
2
report any past Communist involvement to the University. 04 Again, the
25
Court found the requirement unconstitutional.
Professor Scott A. Moss has opined that the judiciary is unduly
deferential to university administrative expertise in the context of faculty

200.
note 40,
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 361-62, 366 (1964); see also Smolla, supra
at 71-72 (explaining the rights-privilege distinction).
Baggett, 377 U.S. at 361-62, 364-65.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 369-71.
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 591-92 (1967).
See id. at 592-93.
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hiring and promotion. 206 As Moss observes, it could be argued that
faculty personnel decisions warrant reduced deference, because the
subjectivity of tenure decisions can easily mask discrimination, "and
because educational diversity and equal opportunity are of such great
importance to society." 207 Similar arguments apply to student admissions
decisions as well. 208
Because it is now well established that professors may not be
prevented from teaching at public universities just because they hold
politically extreme views, 209 at least the same level of protection must
logically apply to aspiring undergraduate enrollees. A public
institution's interest in regulating the speech of its faculty employees is
of a qualitatively greater magnitude than its interest in regulating the
speech of its students. 210 An employee is an "agent" of the institution,
for whose behavior the employer is liable; students are patrons of
university educational services and do not have any authority (real or
apparent) to act on their institution's behalf.211 A professor with
abhorrent views is in a position to do exponentially more harm than an
ordinary rank-and-file student.212 If a professor cannot be denied a job
teaching at a state university because the professor has publicly
identified as Communist or Socialist, then neither can a student be
denied a seat in that professor's class for making the same political
declaration. 213 It follows from the well-established line of university
employment cases that, just as a rejected faculty applicant would have a
First Amendment claim if denied employment based on politically
controversial views, so would a rejected applicant for admission. 214 It is

206.

Scott

A.

Moss, Against

"Academic Deference": How Recent Developments in

&

Employment DiscriminationLaw Undercut an Already Dubious Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP.
LAB. L. 1, 8-9 (2006).
207. Id. at 9-10. Moss cites an employment case outside of academia, Patrick v. Ridge, in
which the court found that an employer could not rebut evidence of hiring discrimination merely by
saying that the candidate would not "fit in" or was not "sufficiently suited" for the job because such
a subjective reason "is at least as consistent with discriminatory intent as it is with

nondiscriminatory intent." Id. at 13-14 (citing Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2004)).
208. See Thro, supra note 84, at 42-44.
209. See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 591-93, 602-04; Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259, 269-71
(8th Cir. 2011).
210. See Estlund, supra note 41, at 1466.
211. See Respondeat Superior, LEGAL INFO. "INST. https://www.law.comell.edu/wex/
respondeatsuperior (last visited Apr. 1, 2021); LoMonte, supra note 31, at 36-37.
212. See Marianne M. Jennings, The Role of the Teaching Scholar in Politically Charged
Times, 3 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFFS. 191, 195, 199-200, 207-08, 210 (2018).
213. See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 591-93, 602-04.
214. See, e.g., Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259, 269-71 (8th Cir. 2011).
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"

a fallacy, then, to assume that colleges have total discretion to turn away
2
students based on their social media speech.
In 2017, the Fourth Circuit decided a rare First Amendment case
contesting a college's denial of admission based on the applicant's
216 the court declined to find a First
speech. In Buxton v. Kurtinitis,
Amendment violation when a plaintiff was refused admission to a
community college's radiation therapy program based on comments he
217
made about his religious beliefs during an admissions interview.
While the case involved remarks made directly to college employees on
campus-and not remarks made on social media before becoming a
candidate for admission-the Fourth Circuit's analysis is instructive in
anticipating how a court might adjudicate a free speech claim
implicating online speech.
In 2013, Dustin Buxton applied to a competitive radiation therapy
218
program that admitted around fifteen students annually. While Buxton
was invited to participate in the clinical observation and interview
phases of the application process, he scored thirty-sixth out of forty-four
219
The
applicants, which was below the cutoff for the available slots.
program director who wrote up her notes of Buxton's interview observed
that he "brought up religion a great deal during the interview" and added
that "religion cannot be brought up in the clinic by therapist .. . or
students." 2 20 The notes also referenced other shortcomings in his
interview style: "His answers to several of the questions were very
22 1
Buxton was not admitted,
textbook and lacked interpersonal skills."
to increase his
suggestions
and although he was provided with some
competitive standing and improve his chances of gaining admission, he
failed to gain admission upon reapplying in 2014.222 Buxton sued,
arguing that the director's notes evidenced that his religious speech was
held against him, in violation of both the Free Speech Clause and
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as well as the Equal
215. The fact that an applicant does not yet have a concrete "interest" in college enrollment
may be relevant for purposes of a due process claim, but it is not applicable in a First Amendment
analysis. See infra Part V.D. As has long been held in the hiring context, being denied appointment
to a job on the basis of speech is actionable just as being fired on the basis of speech would be. See,
question that
e.g., Hubbard v. EPA, 949 F.2d 453, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("There can be no serious
on the basis
against
discriminated
be
cannot
jobs
their
in
interests
even individuals without property
of their speech.").
216. 862 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 2017).
217. Id. at 424-25.
218. Id. at 425.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 426.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 3 The trial court
granted summary dismissal of all claims, and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed. 224
The Buxton court's discussion of the proper framework by which to
analyze a failure-to-admit claim is instructive because it illustrates that
no preexisting line of cases is a perfect fit. First, the court declined to
apply public employment case law to the setting of college
admissions. 22 Next, the court rejected Buxton's contention that public
forum doctrine should govern the case, because public forum case law is
about being denied access to property to engage in expression, not about
after-the-fact retaliation for the speaker's choice of words. 226 Ultimately,
the court found that the closest analog to college admissions was the
Supreme Court's ruling in NationalEndowment for the Arts v. Finley,227
which rejected a facial First Amendment challenge to the National
Endowment for the Arts' implementation of congressionally mandated
"decency" standards in allocating federal arts grants.2 28 The Buxton court
decided that the college admissions process, like the process of
evaluating applications for arts grants, inherently requires making
speech-based distinctions, so that the usual skepticism of content-based
decision-making is inapplicable: "[F]or an interview process to have any
efficacy at all, distinctions based on the content, and even the viewpoint,
of the interviewee's speech during the interview is required." 2 29 The
court concluded that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment is
simply "not implicated" in the context of an admissions interview,
holding: "[T]he Free Speech Clause does not protect speech expressed in
an admissions interview from admissions consequences in a competitive
process." 230 But the court added that "constitutional protections against
discrimination remain in full force even in a competitive application and
interview process," so that the lack of First Amendment recourse does
not leave future college applicants defenseless. 21
The court then dispensed with Buxton's alternative theory that the
college
violated
the
Establishment
Clause
by
preferring
non-religiousness in a context in which religiousness is not a legitimate
223. Id.
224. Idat 426-27, 433.
225. See id. at 427 ("Buxton was not a public employee, nor was he interviewing to be one. As
such, the district court properly found that this line of cases was inapplicable to the present case.").

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 427-28.
524 U.S. 569 (1998).
Buxton, 862 F.3d at 429-30; Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 572-73.
Buxton, 862 F.3d at 430.
Id. at 431.
Id.
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consideration. 232 The college had a legitimate secular purpose for
considering Buxton's decision to interject his religious faith into the
conversation, the court held, because college officials reasonably
believed that Buxton might also bring up religion with patients, contrary
to professional protocols: "Whether an individual brings up religion,
politics, their sex life, or their love of the New York Yankees, the topics
broached by an interviewee are fair, secular metrics for determining that
233
person's interpersonal skills."
A federal district court in New York applied the Buxton decision in
the case of an applicant who claimed she was rejected from a graduate
program at the City University of New York ("CUNY") because of her
2 34
Hasidic Jewish identity in Weiss v. City University of New York. The
applicant claimed that CUNY penalized her for disclosing her religious
upbringing in her personal statement and mentioning that Yiddish was
her first language.2 " The court, relying solely on Buxton, found no
2 36
But the court did allow
actionable First Amendment retaliation claim.
the plaintiff to proceed on an alternative Establishment Clause theory,
crediting her allegation that the University used the interview process to
23 7
"weed out applicants based on religion."
While instructive to illustrate the deference paid to admission
decisions, both the Buxton and Weiss cases notably involve universities'
assessment of speech that the applicants themselves volunteered
2 38
What the applicant
through, respectively, an interview and an essay.
chooses to emphasize to the admissions office may legitimately factor
239
into the assessment of the applicant's "people skills" and judgment.
Indeed, the Buxton ruling was expressly couched as rejecting First
Amendment scrutiny of "speech expressed in an admissions
interview."2 " But a post on a Twitter account that might have been
written two years earlier is a categorically different matter.
To believe that state universities have free rein to consider online
speech in admissions decisions, without limitation, would make the
admissions office the only place on campus where the First Amendment
ceases to apply. Once a student has enrolled, the First Amendment

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 431-32.
Id. at 432.
No. 17-CV-3557, 2019 WL 1244508, at *1-2, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2019).
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *8-9.
See Burton, 862 F.3d at 432; Weiss, 2019 WL 1244508, at *1.
Buxton, 862 F.3d at 432.
Id. at 431.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss3/6

36

LoMonte and Shannon: Admissions against Pinterest: The First Amendment Implications of

2021 ]

ADMISSIONS AGAINST PINTEREST

809

forcefully protects against speech-motivated removals. 241 For example,
during the Vietnam War era, a Nebraska student won reinstatement after
his college blocked him from reregistering because he was violating a
newly enacted prohibition against long hairstyles, 242 and a Virginia
student gained readmission after being excluded because he took part in
an anti-war demonstration. 243
Even inside the classroom during class time, where the college's
discretion is at its highest and the student's interest in individual
expression is at its lowest, some degree of First Amendment protection
applies. 24 For instance, the Tenth Circuit found that a student who was
compelled to recite a profane monologue as part of a drama class
assignment, despite voicing religious-based objections, stated triable
claims for violating her First Amendment rights. 245 Although the court
determined that the University's burden was only to show the reasonable
"pedagogical" justification required to satisfy the Supreme Court's
Hazelwood standard, the student nevertheless was allowed to proceed on
a theory that the University singled her out for unfavorable treatment
based on anti-Mormon bias, which, in the court's view, would not be a
reasonable pedagogical justification. 246
For these reasons, a student who can demonstrate a
cause-and-effect between constitutionally protected speech, and an
adverse admissions decision from a state institution should have
recourse under the First Amendment. The only unanswered questionsand they are substantial questions-are, first, at what point the
applicant's choice of words will cease being constitutionally protected
(the Tinker "disruption" point, or somewhere else), and, second, what
burden the state will have to surmount to justify a rejection based on
speech (the strict scrutiny that applies to other content-based government
decisions, or a more deferential level of scrutiny).2 4 7

241. See, e.g., Saunders v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 417 F.2d 1127, 1128 (4th Cir. 1969);
Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248, 250, 254 (D. Neb. 1970).
242. See Reichenberg, 310 F. Supp. at 252, 254 (finding that, even though university decisions
are normally reviewed deferentially, the personal freedom to choose a hairstyle is a "fundamental
right" that a state university bears a "substantial burden" to overcome).

243. Saunders, 417 F.2d at 1130-31 (citing the Supreme Court's newly decided Tinker decision
and finding that the ability to engage in peaceful political protests on campus is a fundamental right
that a state university cannot penalize without satisfying strict scrutiny).

244.
245.
246.
247.

See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1280, 1293.
Id. at 1292-93.
See supra Part ILB.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

37

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

810

D.

[Vol. 49:773

Due Process and Admissions

Government punishment for speech often implicates due process as
well as the First Amendment, either because the speaker claims to have
received inadequate opportunity to contest the charges, or because the
applicant claims that the rule under which punishment was imposed is
itself defective.2 48 While an applicant who loses out on state college
admission because of speech has all of the essentials for a First
Amendment claim, one essential for a due process claim may be
missing: a protectable property or liberty interest.
It is well accepted that due process applies to the decision to take
away any government benefit, including a college student's continued
249
Courts have
ability to attend a public higher-education institution.
recognized a right to some level of process-notice and an opportunity
to be heard, though perhaps not a formal hearing-even when the
250
The
student has not yet begun attending, but has been accepted.
question in any due process case is what quantum of process is owed,
which varies based on the nature of the deprivation and the burden on
2 1
the government to provide pre-deprivation process.
When punishment is based on behaviors that equate to personal
misconduct in violation of disciplinary rules, the individual is entitled to
due process. 2 2 The case law concerning due process in disciplinary
dismissals of enrolled students is clear: Disciplinary dismissals require
3
the institution to afford the student notice and opportunity to be heard.s
Academic dismissals do not require the same level of due process for
enrolled students.25 4 Once a removal is characterized as academic, little
248. See Fernand N. Dutile, Students and Due Process in Higher Education: Of Interests and
Procedures,2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 243, 251-53, 265 (2001).
249. See id. at 246-48 (describing the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence in the
context of higher education); see also Calvert, supra note 61, at 297.
250. See Martin v. Helstad, 578 F. Supp. 1473, 1482 (W.D. Wis. 1983) ("While an accepted
applicant has only a slight property interest in admission prior to matriculation ... there is a
sufficient interest so as to require some procedural due process" to resolve a factual dispute over
whether the candidate lied on his application); see also Dutile, supra note 248, at 245.
251. See Martin, 578 F. Supp. at 1482 (explaining the Supreme Court's Mathews factors for
determining what level of procedural formality is required for varying types of deprivations).
252. See Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1961).
253. See id. at 157 ("In the disciplining of college students there are no considerations of
immediate danger to the public, or of peril to the national security, which should prevent
the ... [college] from exercising at least the fundamental principles of fairness by giving the
accused students notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard in their own defense.").
254. See Monroe v. Ark. State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that a student's
dismissal was appropriately categorized as academic when the student failed to complete assigned
coursework); see also Richmond v. Fowlkes, 228 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
college's decision to remove a student who failed exams, came late to class, and engaged in
inappropriate classroom behavior was appropriately categorized as academic).
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formal process is required and the removal decision is reviewed with
extra-strength deference.255 Although the line between an academic
versus disciplinary action is not ironclad, one court has helpfully
explained: "Academic dismissals arise from a failure to attain a standard
of excellence in studies whereas disciplinary dismissals arise from acts
of misconduct." 2 6 The primary rationale for applying reduced scrutiny
to an academically based removal is that academic decisions require
specialized subject-matter expertise that judges lack (e.g., who is a
satisfactory performer in a pre-med program and who is not).2 " Seen in
this light, disqualifying an applicant because of offensive online
speech-a decision made by non-faculty admissions employees-does
not seem to qualify for academic deference by the judiciary.2 S Indeed,
the very same judgment calls are being made every day in non-academic
workplaces by supervisors who must decide whether to punish
employees for offensive online speech.2 59
The Supreme Court's seminal pronouncement came in Board of
Curators v. Horowitz,2 6 involving the dismissal of a medical student
after unfavorable reviews of her performance in a clinical program. 261
Even assuming a due process right to continued attendance, the Court
concluded that the student received all of the process to which she was
entitled-a "careful and deliberate" assessment-and was not owed a

255. See Dutile, supra note 248, at 290 ("with regard to academic cases, the courts have taken
an essentially hands-off approach, deferring to the academic expertise of campus officials.");
Barbara A. Lee, Judicial Review of Student Challenges to Academic Misconduct Sanctions, 39 J.

COLL. & U.L. 511, 523-24 (2013) (writing that "students are overwhelmingly unsuccessful in their
quests to overturn the colleges' judgments" once a disciplinary case is categorized as academic);

Henderson v. Engstrom, No. 10-4116, 2012 WL 4009108, at *7 (D.S.D. Sept. 12, 2012) ("There is
even more flexibility granted to schools when a student is dismissed for academic rather than
disciplinary reasons.").

256. Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 931 (Tex. 1995); see also Henderson,
2012 WL 4009108, at *8 ("Academic dismissals usually occur when there are problems with the
student's grades, an inability to perform the work, poor class attendance, or other academic
failings.").
257. See Dutile, supra note 248, at 247-50.
258.

See Emily Deyring, Comment, "ProfessionalStandards" in Public University Programs:

Must the Court Defer to the University on FirstAmendment Concerns?, 50 SETON HALL L. REV.
237, 247 (2019) ("Academic evaluation should not extend to student speech made in a private
capacity off campus, which is otherwise protected by the First Amendment."); see also Martin v.
Helstad, 578 F. Supp. 1473, 1483 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (concluding that a factfmding determination as
to whether a law school applicant made false or misleading statements on his application is not an
academic decision committed solely to the university's discretion).
259. See Donald Carrington Davis, MySpace Isn't Your Space: Expanding the Fair Credit
Reporting Act to Ensure Accountability and Fairness in Employer Searches of Online Social
Networking Services, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 237, 241-45 (2007).

260. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
261. Id. at 79-81.
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formal hearing: "The need for flexibility is well illustrated by the
significant difference between the failure of a student to meet academic
standards and the violation by a student of valid rules of conduct. This
difference calls for far less stringent procedural requirements in the case
of an academic dismissal." 26 2 Following the Court's lead, lower courts
are increasingly deferring to the institution's characterization of the
decision as academic, even when it bears all the hallmarks of a
disciplinary action.2 63
In Keefe v. Adams, 2" a Minnesota community college student
was summarily removed from the nursing program, effectively ending
his enrollment, because he insulted a classmate in a series of Facebook
265
The college
posts that included a hyperbolic reference to violence.
classified the decision as an academic one because it was conveyed to
Keefe by the supervisor of his academic program, even though the
speech took place off campus, on personal time. 266 Keefe argued that,
because the speech took place outside the context of university activities,
he should have the same level of constitutional protection that would
apply to any other speaker in the off-campus world, not a diminished
"student" level of rights. 267 But the trial court, and then the Eighth
Circuit, disagreed and upheld the University's decision, applying
deferential scrutiny. 268
In a rare, and perhaps unique, case applying a due process analysis
to an initial admissions decision, rather than to the decision to remove an
already-enrolled student, a federal district court in Ohio found that some
due process protections adhere to college admissions, but that the
269
Jack Grove
adequacy of that process is reviewed deferentially.
claimed that he was unfairly denied admission to the veterinary medicine
graduate program at The Ohio State University based on an unduly
subjective interview process, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment

262. Id. at 84-86.
263. See, e.g., Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722, 731 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that while
plaintiff's "intransigence might suggest that her dismissal was disciplinary, her refusal to
acknowledge and deal with her problems furnished a sound academic basis for her dismissal");
Davis v. Mann, 721 F. Supp. 796, 799-800 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (stating that plaintiff "contends that
the complaints lodged against him charged instances of personal misconduct rather than academic
shortcomings. It is the court's opinion, however, that the reasons for plaintiff's dismissal are
correctly characterized as academic.").
264. 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016).
265. Id. at 526-27.
266. See id. at 526-27, 529.
267. Id. at 531.
268. Id. at 531, 533, 537.
269. Grove v. Ohio State Univ. Coll. of Vet. Med., 424 F. Supp. 377, 384 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
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right to due process. 270 The court did find a sufficiently substantive
interest to entitle the plaintiff to due process: the liberty interest in
preparing to enter his chosen profession. 27 1 But the court concluded that
the application and interview process was not "so vague and arbitrary as
to deny a fair opportunity to meet the admission requirements," which is
all that the court's deferential notion of due process required. 272
Instructively, by contrast to the "social media rejection" scenario, the
court premised its evaluation on the many checks and balances in Ohio
State's review process, which afforded Grove ample opportunity to be
heard: Grove had three chances to meet with members of the admissions
committee to present information in favor of his candidacy and explain
any shortcomings in his record. 2 73
This decision, however, is a relative outlier among the handful of
known due process challenges to a lost chance to attend college. 274 More
commonly, courts find that there is neither a liberty nor a property
interest in competing for college admission, and in the absence of a
concrete interest, there is no entitlement to any particular degree of
process before deprivation. 27 But even the lack of a recognized property
or liberty interest does not settle the due process question entirely.2 76 In
the context of regulations on speech, due process also is implicated when
a speech-prohibitive regulation is unduly vague or confers unbridled
discretion on government decision makers. 2 77 That almost no
higher-educational institutions appear to have formal policies
270. Id. at 379, 381.
271. Id. at 382-83.
272. Id. at 384-85.
273. Id. at 386.
274. Compare id. at 383 (finding that the plaintiff had a liberty interest that was infringed upon
by the defendant's denial of admission to the plaintiff), with Tobin v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 59 F. Supp.
2d 87, 90 (D. Me. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff's "unilateral expectation" of admission was
insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a property interest).
275. See, e.g., Tobin, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (stating that a "unilateral expectation" of admission
to law school is too immaterial to give rise to due process protection); Szejner v. Univ. of Alaska,
944 P.2d 481, 486 (Alaska 1997) ("A person does not have a property interest in admission to
graduate school.").
276. See, e.g., Khademi v. S. Orange Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1016,
1023 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding a due process violation where decision makers had unrestrained
discretion in decision-making regarding speech rather than where a property or liberty interest was
lacking).
277. See Hall v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 681 F.2d 965, 966, 969 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that a
public school's rules against distributing literature on campus were facially overbroad and
unconstitutional because "they do not furnish sufficient guidance to prohibit the unbridled discretion

that is proscribed by the Constitution"); Khademi, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1023 (striking down the
college district's procedures for obtaining a permit for expressive activity on campus grounds
because "these provisions provide the presidents with absolutely no standards to guide their
decisions," opening the door to content-based suppression).
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constraining the exercise of admissions officers' discretion is itself a red
278
Courts have long disfavored open-ended
flag of unconstitutionality.
policies that enable government decision makers to exercise unfettered
discretion over speech. 2 79 The Supreme Court has repeatedly struck
down statutes and ordinances that confer unbridled discretion to silence
280
The First Amendment
speech in arbitrary or discriminatory ways.
requires neutral, objective standards to guard against the abuse of
28 1
discretion to penalize disfavored speakers or unpopular viewpoints.
While the use of social media in admissions may get a highly
deferential review for arbitrariness, it is not even clear that universities
would be able to surmount that legally minimal hurdle, given that the
decision to review (or not review), and for what type of content, appears
to be entirely left up to each admissions employee. For instance, one
admissions director told Consumer Reports that she is normally too busy
to check applicants' social media profiles, but "there certainly have been
2 82
A
times where I've looked up a student just out of curiosity."
out
singled
was
profile
disqualified applicant who could show that her
for scrutiny for no reason-"just out of curiosity"-would have little
283
difficulty establishing arbitrariness.
A university predictably would argue that the disappointed
applicant deserves less process-or none at all--because there has been
no detrimental reliance. A student who is expelled after having enrolled
is, arguably, suffering a more serious deprivation, having invested in
changing residences and having turned down other offers of admission.
But that is not decisively the case. No court has ever said that a

278. See supra Part IV.B.
279. David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1333, 1359 (2005); Andrew
E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 279, 286-89 (2003).
280. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-57 (1988)
(observing that "the mere existence of the licensor's unfettered discretion, coupled with the power
of prior restraint, intimidates parties into censoring their own speech, even if the discretion and
power are never actually abused").
281. See id. at 760 ("[T]he Constitution requires that the city establish neutral criteria to insure
that the licensing decision is not based on the content or viewpoint of the speech being
considered."); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 809 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("The city must establish neutral criteria embodied in 'narrowly drawn, reasonable and
definite standards,' in order to ensure that discretion is not exercised based on the content of
speech.").
282.

Prachi Bhardwaj, Yes, Colleges Check Applicants' Social Media Posts, CONSUMER REPS.

(Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/social-media/colleges-check-applicants-socialmedia-posts.
283. See id.; see also Dutile, supra note 248, at 283 n.293 ("'Arbitrary or capricious' means an
institutional decision lacking a rational basis or motivated by bad faith or ill will unrelated to
academic performance.").
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university is free to expel a student without process if the student is
living at home with his parents and attending the local commuter
college, or if the student did not reject any competing acceptance offers.
Such questions do not seem to arise at all in due process challenges to
expulsions. The entitlement to process, then, is not solely a product of
detrimental reliance, and it is not the student plaintiff's burden to
establish detrimental reliance to recover for a denial of process. 284
Consider a different type of government-issued privilege: a license
to drive. Let us suppose that a state Department of Motor Vehicles
("DMV") decided to penalize a particularly outspoken critic of the DMV

(let us call him "Reggie") by denying him the privilege of driving on
account of his caustic views. It seems farfetched that a reviewing court
would find a decisive difference between revoking Reggie's license after
he had been driving for one week versus denying him the opportunity to
take the driver's test at all. If, in each instance, the decision was equally
motivated by Reggie's political speech, Reggie assuredly would have a
constitutional claim. It seems comparably farfetched that, having
established that a student who is expelled from college after attending
for one week is entitled to a due process hearing, a court would conclude
that no constitutional protections adhere when a student is refused
admission on a constitutionally infirm basis. Just as no one is assured of
passing the driver's exam, no one is assured of gaining admission upon
applying to a university. But the lost opportunity to be considered for
admission is a meaningful loss, whether conceived as a denial of due
process or as a First Amendment retaliation claim.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In a probing, inside look at college admissions, author Jeffrey
Selingo characterizes the decision process as "confusing and
nonstandard."28 5 Competitive colleges, he explains, receive far more
applicants with outstanding high school grades and standardized test
scores than they can possibly enroll; hence, they must make judgment
calls on intangible qualities such as leadership potential and intellectual
curiosity. 286 As Selingo explains, the process has gotten even more
subjective in recent years as competitive colleges attempt to reward
applicants who have overcome adversity or demonstrated unusual

284.

See Dutile, supra note 248, at 279; Calvert, supra note 61, at 292-93.

285.

JEFFREY SELINGO, WHO GETS IN AND WHY: A YEAR INSIDE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 96

(2020).
286.

See id. at 96, 103, 106.
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tenacity, hoping for a class that reflects a diverse mix of life
experiences.287
Colleges zealously protect their ability to make subjective
judgments about which applicants are suitable, and have convinced
2 88
courts to afford substantial deference to discretionary judgment calls.
Still, even courts that recognize the general rule of deference are careful
to caveat that deference ceases to apply when there is an allegation of
illegality.289 As one court explained, in ruling in favor of a spurned law
school applicant: "That the courts will not interfere with the discretion of
school officials in matters which the law has conferred to their judgment,
unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion, or arbitrary or unlawful
2 90
action, seems to be the unanimous holding of the authorities."
Principles of academic deference and academic freedom, then, do not
excuse compliance with fundamental constitutional principles.
Reviewing social media profiles as a factor in state university
admissions decisions poses three related concerns. First, admissions
officers may be prejudiced (consciously or subconsciously) by learning
personal characteristics that cannot legitimately be part of the acceptance
decision. 291 Second, admissions officers may draw erroneous
conclusions from viewing sarcasm or "inside jokes" devoid of contextor from posts that are not actually the handiwork of the applicants at
all.2 9 2 Third, admissions officers may disqualify or downgrade applicants
for expressing strong views on political and social issues, inhibiting
young people from engaging in political discourse in the only medium
293
readily accessible to them.
As we have seen, constitutional rights apply with some force on the
campus of state colleges and universities, including in the decision of
2 94
whether to remove a student or to rescind an offer of enrollment. And,
as we have seen, state colleges and universities widely incorporate a

287. See id. at 106.
288. Stoner & Showalter, supra note 10, at 586-87.
289. State ex rel. Bartlett v. Pantzer, 489 P.2d 375, 378-79 (Mont. 1971) (per curiam).
290. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 263 P. 433, 437 (Mont.
1928)).
291. See Levin, supranote 181; Koenig & Rustad, supra note 10, at 611; Natasha Singer, They
Loved Your G.P.A. Then They Saw Your Tweets., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/1 1/10/business/they-loved-your-gpa-then-they-saw-yourtweets.html.

292. See Singer, supra note 291.
293. See id.; DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 313-14 (3rd Cir. 2008) (noting that
"overbroad.. .policies can suppress or even chill core protected speech, and are susceptible to
selective application amounting to content-based or viewpoint discrimination . .. in student free
speech cases").
294. See supra Parts II.B, V.A.
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review of social media speech into the admissions decision without the
type of cautionary standards that one would expect to find when a
governmental decision is imbued with constitutional significance.2 9 5
Leaving aside whether there is a clear legal pathway for a rejected
applicant to sue under a First Amendment or due process theory, relying
on social media in making admissions decisions is fraught with peril. We
cannot say for certain that turning loose admissions officers to apply
their own subjective standards and judgments to social media profiles is
unconstitutional, but we can say that it is a bad idea.
A.

Why It Is a Bad Idea: Online Speech Poses Unique Mistranslation
Risks

Social media pages can be a revealing window into the lives of their
creators. The Facebook platform is built to elicit profile information that
includes one's relationship status, favorite forms of entertainment,
family photos, and other disclosures that could influence the opinions of
others who view the profile page. Even when personal characteristics are
not overtly listed as part of a personal biography, social media users
share so much about their habits, affiliations, and beliefs that most
people-probably correctly-believe that their political and religious
views can readily be inferred from their profile pages. 296 That impression
is fortified by research. One 2013 study concluded that, just by looking
at the Facebook pages and groups "liked" by accountholders, relatively
accurate conclusions could be made about their sexual identity, drug use,
political beliefs, and other personal qualities. 297 A 2017 study of 155
Facebook users concluded that people hold less favorable views of
coworkers who frequently post political material to Facebook, and that
those unfavorable impressions can spill over into the workplace and

295. See supra Part IV.A-B. In a 2008 article, the then Dean of Stetson Law School advocated
that, if postsecondary institutions elect to conduct criminal background checks as part of the
admissions screening process, they should only do so with the guidance of a written policy that
includes considering what problem(s) the screening exists to solve and what outcome(s) the policy
intends to produce. Darby Dickerson, Background Checks in the University Admissions Process: An
Overview of Legal and Policy Considerations, 34 J. COLL. & U.L. 419, 489-90 (2008). The same
could be equally said of social media screening.
296. See Paul Hitlin & Lee Rainie, FacebookAlgorithms and PersonalData, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Jan.
16, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/01/16/facebook-algorithms-andpersonal-data (reporting results of a survey in which sixty-five percent of Facebook users said it
would be easy to discern their religious beliefs and seventy-one percent said it would be easy to
identify their political beliefs based on what they share to Facebook).
297. Josh Halliday, Facebook Users Unwittingly Revealing Intimate Secrets, Study Finds,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2013, 3:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/mar/ 1]/face
book-users-reveal-intimate-secrets.
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29 8
So it is
limit career advancement opportunities for the "over-sharers."
and
impressions
form
pages
media
clear that people who view social
draw conclusions about the proprietors of those pages. And this includes
conclusions with no legitimate place in the admissions process.
But even though it can be a mirror that candidly reveals warts and
blemishes, social media sometimes more closely resembles a funhouse
mirror, reflecting a distorted image. During the spring 2020 worldwide
lockdown that accompanied the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic,
images circulated throughout social media that appeared to expose
people engaging in unsafe behavior, but which often turned out to be
deceptive because of selective cropping, lack of visual perspective, or
use of telephoto lenses. 2" Visual editing and filtering has fueled a
generation of body anxiety problems as young women compare
themselves against idealized images of impossibly thin Instagram fitness
models.3 0 0 Because of its spontaneity and informality, social media is
especially susceptible to misinterpretation by people who see posts
unmoored from context. In one especially tragic case, a Texas teenager
spent more than four months in jail after an arrest on felony threat
speech charges because a Facebook chat in which he discussed a
graphically violent video game was shared with a person unaware of the
301
backstory, who assumed that the teen was plotting a real shooting.
Even social media companies themselves, with armies of trained
moderators, experience contextual misunderstandings that can result in
harmless or well-intentioned posts being taken down. In December
2020, Facebook announced that its recently appointed "appeals court" of
outside experts had identified its first six cases to adjudicate, and five of
the six fell into the category of, according to the post authors, contextual
misreadings-posts that the creators shared to call attention to abhorrent
news events, which Facebook mistook for endorsement of the

298.

Kaloydis et al., supra note 11, at 249, 260-63.

299.

Joey D'Urso, Here's Why Some Pictures of People Supposedly Breaking Coronavirus

Social Distancing Rules Can Be Misleading, BUzzFEED NEWS (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/joeydurso/coronavirus-social-distancing-lockdown-photos.
300. Marika Tiggemann & Isabella Anderberg, Social Media Is Not Real: The Effect of
&

'Instagram vs Reality' Images on Women's Social Comparison and Body Image, 22 NEW MEDIA

Soc'Y 2183, 2184-85 (2020); see also Kelly Oakes, The Complicated Truth About Social Media
and Body Image, BBC FUTURE (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190311how-social-media-affects-body-image (citing research concluding that viewing online images of
"beautiful people doing exercise, or at least pretending to-might make you harsher on yourself").
301. See Eli Siems, Jailed for a Facebook Post: 19-Year-Old Justin Carter, State Sensitivity
and the Half-Million-Dollar Bail, NAT'L COAL. AGAINST CENSORSHIP (July 10, 2013),
https://ncac.org/news/blog/jailed-for-a-facebook-post- 19-year-old-justin-carter-state-sensitivity-andthe-half-million-dollar-bail.
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underlying abhorrent behavior. 302 For instance, one appellant shared a
quote from Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels, but explained that the
quote was used unflatteringly to suggest parallels between the tactics of
German Nazis and the tactics of the Trump Administration. 3 3 If
Facebook, with its vast assets, cannot reliably distinguish between posts
expressing hateful sentiments and posts calling out hateful sentiments, it
is hard to be confident that a graduate student assigned to review 125
admissions applications a week will fare any better.3 4
The facts behind a Minnesota Supreme Court case amply illustrate
the dangers of taking social media posts at face value. In the Tatro v.
University of Minnesota305 case, mortuary science student Amanda Tatro
was disciplined for a series of Facebook posts in which she provided
gallows humor commentary about her assignment to dissect a cadaver. 306
In one post, she wrote that she planned to spend the evening "updating
my 'Death List #5,"' and in another, she bid farewell to her assigned
cadaver with the comment, "Lock of hair in my pocket." 307 While the
posts may have seemed alarming to those unacquainted with Tatro, they
were actually cultural reference points, as the "death list" comment was
a line from one of her favorite films, Kill Bill, and the "lock of hair"
comment was based on a line from a popular Black Crowes song. 308
Neither was meant literally to indicate that Tatro was contemplating
homicide or that she had defiled a corpse. 30 9 Yet because the posts
caused at least one classmate to complain to the instructor, who then
summoned the police, the posts were treated as a punishable offense.31 0
When it comes to humor, context is everything. A good deal of
contemporary humor obliterates boundaries of good taste. Take, for
example, the long-running Broadway musical, The Book of Mormon, by
the co-creators of the transgressive South Park television cartoon series.
The musical debuted in 2011 to rave reviews and won nine Tony
awards, including Best Musical, and its soundtrack sold so many copies
302.

See Whitney Tesi, Facebook's Oversight Board Has Announced Its First Six Cases,

SLATE (Dec. 2, 2020, 12:46 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/12/facebook-oversight-boardreleased-cases.html (describing facts of cases accepted by the Facebook Oversight Board from
among 20,000 submissions).
303. Id.
304. See SELINGO, supra note 285, at 95 (explaining that most large public universities have
abandoned screening by full-time admissions staffers because of the overwhelming volume of
applications and have, instead, turned to graduate students to perform most of the reviews).
305. 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012)
306. Id. at 511.
307. Id. at 512-13.
308. Id. at 513.
309. See id. at 514.
310. Id. at 512-13.
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31
that it cracked the Billboard pop charts. ' The play and soundtrack revel
in outrageous humor, with no subject-religion, AIDS, famine in
31 2
Such
Africa-too sensitive, even directing strong profanities at God.
language is now within the accepted boundaries of mainstream
entertainment-but if a high school drama student tweeted her favorite
lines from the musical upon leaving the theatre, there is every chance
that her tweets would be taken to indicate malignant racism,
homophobia, and anti-Christian prejudice.
A growing body of research demonstrates that people's interactions
with social media cannot safely be oversimplified. For instance, the fact
that a Twitter user clicks the "like" or "retweet" button on a tweet posted
by another user might indicate agreement with the sentiment-or it
might not. One 2014 study found that people regularly use the "like"
button on Twitter as a bookmarking function, to retrieve an item for later
viewing rather than to indicate that they actually approve of its
content.31 3 Nor can it be inferred that someone "following" a celebrity,
cause, or organization on social media is doing so to indicate affinity;
3 14
the "hate-follow" is a well-documented phenomenon.

311. Jeff Lunden, How 'The Book Of Mormon' Cast Album Cracked the 'Billboard'Top 10,
15, 2011, 2:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/therecord/2011/09/15/
NPR (Sept.
140509256/how-the-book-of-mormon-soundtrack-cracked-the-billboard-top-10; Peter Marks, 'The
12, 2011),
POST (June
Book of Mormon' Wins Big at Tony Awards, WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-book-of-rmrmon-wins-big-at-tonyawards/2011/06/12/AGGXgRSH_story.html.
312.

See Geoff Griffin, Review: The Book of Mormon Musical, SALT LAKE CITY WKLY. (Mar.

2
23, 2011), https://www.cityweekly.net/utah/review-the-book-of-mormon-musical/Content?oid= 15
blasphemy
obscenity,
of
levels
to
new
Broadway
push
musical
the
of
3423 (commenting that "parts

and outrageousness"); Adam Markovitz, 'Book of Mormon' Bows on Broadway: How Offensive Is

It?, ENT. WKLY. (Feb. 25, 2011, 5:22 PM), https://ew.com/article/2011/02/25/book-of-mormon
(describing the play as "jam-packed with foul language . .. sexually explicit jokes, and enough
blasphemy to knock your church-going grandma right out of her seat").
313. See Florian Meier et al., More than Liking and Bookmarking? Towards Understanding
Twitter Favouriting Behaviour, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL AAAI
CONFERENCE ON WEBLOGS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 348, 350-52 (2014) (reporting that, in a survey of

606 Twitter users, one of the most common reasons volunteered for clicking the "favorite" buttonwhich has since been renamed as the "like" feature-was to bookmark the post for future reading,
second only to an actual desire to indicate enthusiasm for the post or its author).
on
314. See Sarah Weldon, Why It Feels So Deeply Good to Follow Your Mortal Enemies
3
Instagram, COSMOPOLrTAN (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.cosmopolitan.com/lifestyle/a3477 113/
hate-following-social-media (quoting a clinical psychologist's observation that people who channel
their anger into following social media accounts they dislike can reduce stress and anxiety); Katie
Way, 'Why Do I Need to Hate-Follow, Hate-Read, and Hate-Watch?,' VICE (Nov. 2, 2020, 7:30
https://www.vice.com/en/article/4addam/why-do-i-follow-people-i-hate-on-social-media
AM),
(quoting researchers who liken the experience of following an unlikable person's social media feed
to the emotional release of watching a horror film, and adding that "we're socially hardwired to look
at other people's lives, even other people we dislike"); Joel Golby, Hate-Following People on
Social Media Is Therapeutic, Says Science, VICE (Oct. 23, 2014, 11:00 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/g8kkj/oel-golby-hate-follow-is-good-for-you (citing researchers'
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Unlike other forms of speech, social media is also uniquely
susceptible to error, misattribution, or outright fraud. No one
"accidentally" writes a book or publishes a column in The New York
Times, but it is widely documented that people accidentally click on
social media posts for which they never intended to indicate support.3 15
Famously, the singer Courtney Love prevailed in what has been called
the world's first "libel-by-tweet" case, in part because she convinced a
jury that a Twitter post accusing a former attorney of misconduct was
meant to be a private message and was made publicly visible by
mistake. 316 Nor is it difficult to create a social media account that
purports deceptively to belong to another person; The New York Times
estimates that "millions" of impersonation accounts exist, and that once
an impostor account is established, it can be difficult to get a social
media platform operator to deactivate it.317 High school athletes have
been targeted by scammers impersonating college coaches on Twitter,
sometimes asking for money in exchange for reviewing the athlete's
highlight films. 318 Anyone who has ever walked away from a shared
computer without logging off, or had a smartphone stolen, is aware that
people with an agenda to play pranks, or worse, can readily gain access

findings that "when people are in a bad mood, they're more likely to linger on the social media
profiles of people who are worse off than them").
315.

See Robert Burns, Pentagon: Retweet of Call for Trump to Resign
Was Accidental,

BLOOMBERG (Nov.

16, 2017, 3:21 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artices/2017-11(explaining that the operator of an
official United States Defense Department Twitter account accidentally hit the "retweet" button on a
post calling on President Trump to resign); Chloe Bryan, The Accidental Super Like: Tinder's Most

16/pentagon-retweet-of-call-for-trump-to-resign-was-accidental

Awkward Phenomenon, MASHABLE (Aug. 16, 2018), https://mashable.com/article/tinder-super-

likes-accidental (describing embarrassment of dating app users who have accidentally clicked a
button or swiped a phone screen in a way that conveys interest in a potential partner).
316. Maria Elena Fernandez, Courtney Love Wins First Twitter Libel Trial, NBC NEWS (Jan.
24, 2014, 8:22 PM), https://www.nbenews.com/news/world/courtney-love-wins-first-twitter-libeltrial-flna2D 11988969.
317. See Nicholas Confessore & Gabriel J.X. Dance, On Social Media, Lax Enforcement Lets
Impostor Accounts Thrive, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/
technology/social-media-impostor-accounts.html (reporting that "social media companies often fail
to vigorously enforce their own policies against impersonation"); see also JoBeth McDaniel, How I
(Digitally) Killed My Twitter Impostor, DAILY BEAST, https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-idigitally-killed-my-twitter-impostor (Apr. 14, 2017, 3:22 PM) (chronicling a journalist's difficulty
in getting Twitter to deactivate an impersonator account that was tweeting profane rants "rife with

bad grammar and misspellings" using her name, stating specifically that "[e]xecutives and editors
were likely doing Google searches of my name, checking me out. I had no way of knowing-or
even asking-if they had mistaken this monkey-faced avatar for me.").
318. Geoff Preston & Kennington Lloyd Smith III, Spotting the Fake: How to Find Counterfeit
College

Recruiting

Twitter

Accounts,

GREENVILLE

NEWS

(June

23,

https://www.greenvilleonline.rom/story/sports/high-school/2020/06/22/how-spot-fake-collegesports-coaches-recruiters-pop-up-twitter-social-media/5288479002.
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3 19
On social media, then, there is a real risk
to other people's accounts.
not just of misunderstanding the speaker's sentiment, but of
3 20
misattributing a sentiment to an unwitting "speaker."
The risk of unfairly stigmatizing people based on social media posts
falls disproportionately on the people who are already at a competitive
321
As Professors Koenig and
disadvantage in the admissions process.
Rustad have written: "Digital marks of shame, resulting from naive
online postings, are particularly indelible, deep, and far-reaching for
322
For instance, they write, a
members of already devalued groups."
college admissions officer might reach stereotypical conclusions about
cap,
an applicant who is photographed wearing a backwards baseball
323
And
teens.
Black
with
popular
items
fashion
sagging pants, or other
affluent White families are the most likely to have the aid of admissions
counselors who advise them in sanitizing their online personas,
amplifying the risk that social media will work to the disadvantage of
3
Black and Brown young people. " The risk is greater still for students
who express non-majoritarian views that challenge mainstream
conventions-exactly the students that an institution devoted to the
325
exploration of ideas should want most.
We need not speculate whether, in the absence of an opportunity for
redress, some applicants will be victimized by cultural mistranslations of
innocent online speech-because there is evidence of such
decision-making on campus already. Take the case of Francis Schmidt, a
professor at New Jersey's Bergen Community College, who was
suspended and ordered to undergo counseling because he posted a photo

and
319. See, e.g., Ken Belson et al., ForLaremy Tunsil and N.F.L., Combustion When 2a Bong
6 4 3
/ 0/
Social Media Mix, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 01 /0
sports/football/laremy-tunsil-at-nfl-draft-combustion-when-a-bong-a-gas-mask-and-social-mediaNFL
mix.html (reporting that star University of Mississippi football player was downgraded as an
inhaling
him
show
to
purporting
video
a
draft,
football
prospect when, just before the professional
marijuana smoke was posted to his Twitter account without his authorization).
320. See Singer, supra note 291 (noting concern that "colleges might erroneously identify the
impostor's
account of a person with the same name as a prospective student-or even mistake an
treatment").
unfair
to
leading
potentially
account-as belonging to the applicant,
321. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 10, at 611-13.
322. Id. at 596-97.
323. Id. at 595-96; see also id. at 598 ("College admissions officials may view wearing a [tshirt] with a suggestive logo not as trendy fashion statement, but as an indication of undesirable
deviancy.").
324. See id. at 613 ("While sophisticated parents and high school teachers warn middle class
the risks
students that indiscreet postings may be harmful, lower class youth are often unaware of
created by unwanted viewers.").

325. See Deyring, supra note 258, at 251-52 (making this observation in the context of
can
disciplinary action against already-enrolled students, stating that "sanctions against students
encourage viewpoint discrimination by empowering universities to quiet students who express
unpopular opinions but have no other academic performance problems").
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of his seven-year-old daughter wearing an oversized Game of Thrones
t-shirt bearing one of the HBO drama's signature lines: "I will take what
is mine with fire and blood."3 26 Based on a single social media post, an
overly literal college administration made the leap from fandom of
violent entertainment to a proclivity to commit violence. 327 But Schmidt
was able to summon public support and challenge the decision-because
he had notice. 328 Instead, imagine that an applicant to Bergen
Community College playfully changed her Instagram or Twitter
biography line to read, "I will take what is mine with fire and blood,"
while enjoying a Game of Thrones binge-watch, and elicited the same
overreaction by the College. Because the applicant would have no clue
why she received the "we regret to inform you" email, the decision
would go unchallenged.
B.

Why It Is a Really Bad Idea: Admissions Misjudgments Can Be Life
Altering

The benefits of a college education go beyond intrinsic reward and
personal accomplishment. In 2011, a Pew Research Center study
estimated work life earnings over a period of forty years to be $1.6
million for those who earn a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to
$800,000 for individuals with only a high school diploma. 2 Earning a
four-year degree also correlates to increased employment stability, better
health, lower jobless rates, and lower poverty rates compared with
non-degree holders. 330 While it may once have been regarded as a
"luxury good" accessible to a minority of the population, a college
education is becoming the default rite of passage into the adult working
world. In 1960, 45.1% of all high school graduates went on to college;
by 2019, the figure was 66.2%.331 Being denied acceptance to college,
then, is a life-altering event.
326.

See James Kleiman, College Admits It 'May' Have Violated Art Professor's Civil Rights

over Game of Thrones T-shirt, NJ.COM (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.nj.com/bergen/2014/10/college
admits_it_mayhaveviolatedartprofessorscivil_rightsovergameof thrones_t-shirt.html.
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. Chapter 5: The Monetary Value of a College Education, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 15,
2011),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/05/15/chapter-5-the-monetary-value-of-a-collegeeducation.
330.

See How Does a College Degree Improve Graduates' Employment and Earnings

Potential?, AsS'N PUB. & LAND-GRANT
UNIVS.,
https://www.aplu.org/projects-andinitiatives/college-costs-tuition-and-financial-aid/publicuvalues/employment-earings.html
(last
visited Apr. 1, 2021).
331. College Enrollment Rates of High School Graduates, by Sex: 1960 to 1998, NAT'L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d99/d99tl87.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2021);
College Enrollment and Work Activity of Recent High School and College Graduates Summary,
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While the loss of admission to any one college may seem like a
minimal injury to someone with a dozen different choices, not everyone
is fortunate enough to have a range of options. Federal financial aid data
suggests that as many as sixty-eight percent of candidates apply to just
one college,3 3 2 and an array of personal and family considerations may
limit students' mobility. A student may, for instance, be limited to the
hometown college because of inability to pay rent or because of family
3 33
For such students, rejection by "only" one
caregiving responsibilities.
college potentially sets them up for a lifetime of limited professional and
financial opportunities. It would be tragic for such a decision to turn on a
misreading of a benign casual statement, negating a student's twelve
years of educational preparation.
Notably, the debate about social media speech as a potentially
disqualifying factor in college admissions is taking place against the
backdrop of a nationwide movement-known as "Ban the Box"-to
334
give people with criminal records an opportunity to attend college.
The movement originated in the context of employment screening, and
thirty-five states now have statutes limiting employers' ability to ask
33
Louisiana
about criminal history as part of the selection process.
being
against
applicants
became the first state to protect state college
in
universities
asked about their criminal backgrounds in 2017, and
California and New York have voluntarily agreed to refrain from asking
33 6
Social justice organizations have
for criminal history information.
called on other states to follow suit. In a 2010 report, the Center for
Community Alternatives, a nonprofit organization, concluded that:
"Because broad access to higher education is good for public safety and
the economic growth and well-being of the country as a whole, colleges
U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS. (Apr. 28, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
hsgec.nr0.htm#:~:text=Following%20are%20some%20highlights%20from,percent%20and%2069.8
%20percent%2C%20respectively.
Lauren Camera, A Whole Lot of Students Don't Have a Safety School, U.S. NEWS

&

332.

&

wORLD REP. (Nov. 20, 2015, 1:53 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/ll/
20/majority-of-students-apply-to-only-one-college.
333. See Abigail Wozniak, Going Away to College? School Distance as a Barrierto Higher
Education, ECONOFACT, http://econofact.org/going-away-to-college-school-distance-as-a-barrier-tohigher-education (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
334. See Josh Moody, Ban the Box: Opening the Door to College for Felons, U.S. NEWS
PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best1:42
2020,
17,
wORLD REP. (Jan.

colleges/articles/ban-the-box-opening-the-door-to-college-for-felons.
335.

See Casey Leins, More Data Needed to Determine Whether 'Ban the Box' Laws Work,

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 10, 2019, 12:20 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/articles/2019-09-10/ban-the-box-laws-could-negatively-impact-minorities.
336. Anya Kamenetz, Louisiana Is First State to Ban Public Colleges from Asking About
Criminal History, NPR (June 22, 2017, 8:39 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/

06/22/533833428/louisiana-is-first-state-to-ban-public-colleges-from-asking-about-criminal-histo.
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and universities should refrain from engaging in [criminal background]
screening." 33
Given the growing consensus that people should be able to take
advantage of higher education for self-improvement despite past
transgressions, it is counterintuitive for admission policies to move in
the direction of less forgiveness when the transgression is not a bank
robbery, but a tweet. If we believe that state higher education institutions
should offer people "second chances" to better their lives-even if some
others on campus might feel initial discomfort studying alongside
them33 8-then
a "one bad teenage tweet and you're out" policy is
difficult to reconcile.
C.

A Better Idea: Teaching, and Practicing,FairPlay

We are living in a period of extraordinary political polarization. 339
Many people have come to believe that those holding opposing political
views are not just wrong, but are dangerous, evil, and un-American.34 In
this climate, it is foreseeable that admissions employees who detect that
an applicant is a fan of a polarizing politician may extrapolate that
fandom into concluding that the applicant is of bad character and
undeserving of admission. Social media pages are so replete with
information that cannot legitimately be considered in the admissions
decision that, if colleges insist on viewing the pages at all, there must be
objective and visible guardrails to prevent personal biases from tainting
the process.
Congress has already enacted a variation of the "notice and
opportunity to correct" model as part of the 1974 Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA"). 341 FERPA provides, in part, that a
parent (or, at the college level, a student) has the right to inspect
"education records" maintained by a school or college, to insert
corrective information if the records are incomplete or misleading, and

337. CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS., THE USE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS IN COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS:
RECONSIDERED
32
(2010),
http://www.communityalternatives.org/wp-

content/uploads/2020/02/use-of-criminal-history-records-reconsidered.pdf.
338. See Lauren Camera, When #MeToo and 'Ban the Box' Collide, U.S. NEWS & wORLD
REF. (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/education-news/articles/2019-01-16/whenmetoo-and-ban-the-box-collide (discussing the tension between the renewed concern for protecting
women against sexual assault on campus versus admitting people for rehabilitative purposes
regardless of their criminal histories).
339. See Christie Aschwanden, Why Hatred and 'Othering' of PoliticalFoes Has Spiked to
Extreme Levels, SCI. AM. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-hatredand-othering-of-political-foes-has-spiked-to-extreme-levels.
340. See id.
341. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2).
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42
Exercising
to have a hearing if the corrective measures are denied.
their own
reviewed
have
students
of
scores
rights,
these FERPA access
college admission files to see what recommenders and reviewers said
about them. 4 3 Congress, then, has already recognized that students and
parents have a legitimate interest in making sure that critical educational
decisions are not made on the basis of inaccurate information, even if
3
colleges would prefer not to have their decisions scrutinized. " It would
not represent a drastic departure for Congress to synthesize two existing
bodies of law-FERPA, and the increasingly recognized state statutory
right of "social media privacy" 34 -- to require that colleges disclose their
reliance on social media posts and make any outcome-determinative
posts available for inspection and correction. If colleges find it too
burdensome to notify applicants when their online speech has been a
decisive consideration in a rejection, they can simply do what the
majority of colleges say they already do: refrain from looking at social
media at all.
Congress has a readily adaptable framework in the form of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), and its companion, the Equal Credit
3
Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), and their implementing regulations. 4 The
FCRA allows a person who has had a derogatory credit report that
provokes an adverse credit decision to know what was reported in the
347
The ECOA
file and to dispute incomplete and inaccurate information.
provides that, when an application for credit is rejected, the lender must
furnish a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation with reasonable
specificity, such as low income.348 Most analogously to the college
admissions setting, the FCRA requires employers to obtain the consent
of an applicant before performing a pre-employment credit check for
screening purposes, and requires giving applicants notice and a

342. Id.
343. Molly Hensley-Clancy, Here's How to See What College Admissions Officers Wrote
About You, BUzZFEED NEWS (Jan. 16, 2015, 4:56 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
mollyhensleyelancy/heres-how-to-see-what-college-admissions-officers-wrote-abou.
344. See Aleksandra Lifshits, FERPA Requests Yield Limited Access to Files, BROWN DAILY
HERALD (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.browndailyherald.om/2015/04/22/ferpa-requests-yieldlimited-access-files (reporting that, after publicity surrounding Ivy League students invoking the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act to view their own files arose, the University of
Pennsylvania removed reviewer comments from student files while Yale University began
systematically destroying the files).
345. See supra Part II.B.
346. 15 U.S.C. § 1681; Id. § 1691; see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, A SUMMARY OF YOUR
RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 1-2, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf0096-fair-credit-reporting-act.pdf.
347. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 346, at 1-2.
348. § 1691.
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reasonable opportunity to contest the accuracy of the information if the
credit report is used in making an adverse hiring decision.34 9 Several
commentators have already advocated extending FCRA/ECOA rights to
the analogous context of pre-employment social media screening, or
enacting comparable protections inspired by the credit reporting
framework. 50 One veteran law school dean has recommended that
colleges adopt the FCRA model of providing notification and an
opportunity for correction if they make adverse decisions about students
based on criminal background checks." 1
With the FCRA and the ECOA, Congress has already recognized
the need for disclosure and an opportunity for correction to equalize a
power imbalance in contractual transactions where one side holds all of
the information and can use that information to the detriment of the
less-powerful party.3 2 As with the relationship between a borrower and
a lender, the relationship between a student and a higher educational
institution is understood to be contractual in nature."3 The opportunity
to correct misunderstandings in college admissions becomes even more
essential as highly competitive institutions are inundated with
applications, spending-by one estimate-an average of just eight
minutes reviewing each one. 3 4 If the decision to deny someone a credit
card is important enough for Congress to legislate transparency, it is no
stretch to apply the same rationale to the decision to deny college
admission.
Young people want and deserve to be heard on the pressing social
and political issues of the day, and much contemporary political
discourse is heated and caustic-including, at times, discourse from the

349. § 1681b(b)(2).
350. See Cara R Sronce, Comment, The References of the Twenty-First Century: Regulating
Employers' Use of Social Networking Sites as an Applicant Screening Tool, 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 499,

505-06, 514 (2011). As Sronce stated: "With the benefits of employers' ability to verify that the
way applicants present themselves to their own networks matches up with the way they presented
themselves in an interview or on paper, comes the danger of using that ability for illegal or improper
hiring purposes." Id. at 515-16; see also Davis, supra note 259, at 255 ("Because searches of online
social networking services only stand to become more prevalent and popular among employers,
Congress should expand the Fair Credit Reporting Act to ensure employees that use these websites
adequate protection from unfair, illegal or arbitrary employment decisions.").
351. Dickerson, supra note 295, at 461.
352. See § 1681b(b)(2); § 1691.
353. See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1992) ("It is held generally in
the United States that the basic legal relation between a student and a private university or college is
contractual in nature." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gagne v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 692 N.E.2d
489, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) ("The relationship between a university and its students is considered
contractual in nature.").

354. See SELINGO, supra note 285, at 95.
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highest seats of power.355 Teenagers are at the forefront of movements to
force U.S. policymakers to address climate change, gun violence, and
police brutality, often harnessing the power of social media for
36
But at the same time, fear of the
organizing and awareness-building.
admissions process is causing young people to delete their social media
accounts, hide them from public view, maintain them under assumed
names, or purge anything sharply worded or controversial-all of which
35 7
mutes their voices and diminishes their effectiveness as advocates.
Colleges say that they value outspoken citizenship, but-without clear
assurances that online political speech will carry no negative weight in
the admissions office-their practices are working against that
objective. 35 8
Ultimately, the use of social media as a screening tool poses
philosophical and pedagogical, as well as legal, considerations. The
mentality that social media profiles are "fair game" for consideration in
admissions is rooted, to some degree, in a view of higher education as
preparation for the vagaries of the workforce, where supervisors may
make snap decisions based on a single ill-considered (or misunderstood)
post. But colleges are not just preparing future employees; they are
preparing future employers. Regardless of whether it is constitutional,
making decisive, career-altering decisions on the basis of social media
speech without giving the speaker an opportunity to explain would be a
shortsighted management practice for an employer. By acculturating
355. See Peter Baker, The Profanity President: Trump's Four-Letter Vocabulary, N.Y. TIMES
(May 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/us/politics/trump-language.html (observing
that, as President, Donald Trump trafficked in "four-letter denunciations of his enemies," causing
mainstream news organizations to begin publishing verbatim profanities as part of their political
coverage).
356. See Erin Richards, These Activists Are Too Young to Vote in 2020 Election, but Climate
AM),
5:00
7,
2020,
(Feb.
Up, USA TODAY
Fed
Change Has Them
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/education/2020/02/07/black-history-month-climate-change8 002
("Fed-up youth are agitating for movement on a
nyc-doe-gun-control-segregation/46484 5
and stricter gun control to more social and
environment
variety of causes, from a cleaner
educational equality."); Nicole Javorsky, The Year of the Affected Generation, BLOOMBERG
CITYLAB (Dec. 31, 2018, 10:13 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-31/onclimate-change-and-gun-violence-the- young-speak-up (reporting on "growing political might" of
young voters motivated by concern over inaction on gun violence and climate change, and adding
that "[i]ncreasingly, lawmakers ignore the voices of the young at their own peril").
357. See Taylor Lorenz, From Finstas to 'Ghost Posts': Teens Clean Up Their Online
2017),
13,
(June
MASHABLE
Admissions,
College
for
Footprints
https://mashable.com/2017/06/13/high-school-college-students-online-profiles-clean-up
("Scrubbing social media accounts-or preemptively making sure their online presences can't be
tracked-has become a common move for students entering their senior year of high school.").
358. See Scott Jaschik, Activist GenerationSearchesfor Colleges, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 5,
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/2018/11/05/survey-shows-role-activismand-politics-college-decision-process.
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employers-in-training that it is standard operating procedure to make
decisions on people's character because of the pictures they share on
social networking pages, our educational institutions normalize this
shortsightedness. It is not "educational" to be denied admission to
college for unexplained reasons. 359 To stay true to their core mission,
higher educational institutions should, first, engage in the same critical
inquiry that they expect of their students without leaping to conclusions
based on superficial impressions, and, second, provide the opportunity
for explanation and context that should be afforded in a well-managed
workplace run by the sensible employers that a university education
should aspire to produce.

359. The Alaska Supreme Court made this observation in the context of a dispute over whether
a graduate student's removal qualified as an academic decision or a disciplinary one, holding: "If
the University's interests are truly academic rather than disciplinary in nature, its emphasis should
be on correcting behavior through faculty suggestion, coercion, and forewarning rather than
punishing behavior after the fact." Nickerson v. Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, 975 P.2d 46, 53
(Alaska 1999).
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